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 Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and 
Congress in U.S. Constitutional Democracy 
VICKI C. JACKSON* 
In recent years, legislatures and their members have increasingly asserted stand-
ing to sue other branches of government, in controversies involving state legislators 
or legislatures as party litigants and in controversies involving members of or parts 
of the U.S. Congress. These cases present challenging questions for the federal 
Article III courts, whose jurisdiction has been interpreted to be bounded by “justici-
ability” doctrines, including that the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must 
have standing to do so.  
This Essay will focus on congressional standing, discussing case law involving 
claims by state legislatures or legislators to the extent they are relevant.1 It will ex-
amine congressional standing—including standing of individual Members of 
Congress, standing of parts of Congress, and standing for the whole body—within 
the context of U.S. commitments to democratic constitutionalism, offering a frame-
work for analysis that is intended more to suggest ways of thinking about 
congressional standing than to prescribe a set of answers. 
I. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND STANDING 
In most theories of democratic constitutionalism, major issues of policy are to be 
determined by legislatures; executive and administrative branches may fill out policy 
details in implementing such laws. Courts typically are not given authority to 
govern—their authority is to assure that the other branches govern in accordance 
with law. This is especially so in the United States, where the federal courts play a 
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I served as Court-appointed pro bono amica curiae in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013), to argue against the Court’s jurisdiction on two grounds, one of which was that 
a congressional committee lacked standing to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute 
challenged in that case.  
 1. Some aspects of the standing of state and federal legislators will overlap. But suits by 
Members of Congress also raise distinctive separation of powers concerns not present in suits 
by state legislators. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 39, 50–75. 
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significant role in reviewing the legality of government action but, in James 
Madison’s words, may exercise jurisdiction only in matters of a “Judiciary Nature.”2 
This limitation on the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts has been defined 
through a series of “justiciability” doctrines, including standing. Unlike the “consti-
tutional courts” of Europe, federal courts do not exercise jurisdiction over 
“generalized grievances”; under current standing law, Article III courts cannot 
adjudicate claims unless the party invoking their jurisdiction has “standing” to do 
so.3 In order to have standing, a party must allege an “injury,” arising from “invasion 
of a legally protected interest which is [] concrete and particularized,”4 in a dispute 
“traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.”5 
Despite its theoretical preeminence in governance, Congress has fallen on hard 
times (as have legislatures around the world). In standardized surveys of confidence 
in major institutions, Congress has fallen to astonishing lows in comparison to both 
the presidency and the Supreme Court—indeed, in comparison with virtually every 
other institution asked about.6 Scholars of the Congress, like Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein, began warning of a “broken branch” in their 2006 book, and six 
years later wrote It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional 
System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism.7 In recent years we have seen 
repeated defaults in governance by Congress—threatening not to allow payment of 
the national debt, provoking repeated government shutdowns, and blocking consid-
eration of nominees.8  
As Congress’s functionality has declined, efforts by congressional actors to liti-
gate issues in federal courts have presented federal courts many opportunities to con-
sider legislative standing. In 1997 the Supreme Court, in Raines v. Byrd,9 rejected 
standing for several Members of Congress challenging the constitutionality of the 
                                                                                                             
 
 2. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966). 
 3. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984). 
 4. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 752 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). 
 6. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/DR7A-RMM7] (finding that as of 2016 only 9% of survey 
respondents, when asked, had either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress; 
this was much lower than all other institutions studied, including the presidency (36%) and 
the Supreme Court (36%)). The 2017 data from administration of the same survey is similar: 
12% having a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress, compared with 32% for 
the presidency and 40% for the Supreme Court. Id.  
 7. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: 
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM (2012) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS]; 
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING 
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006). 
 8. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 7; Katharine 
G. Young, American Exceptionalism and Government Shutdowns: A Comparative 
Constitutional Reflection on the 2013 Lapse in Appropriations, 94 B.U. L. REV. 991 (2014)  
 9. 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
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Line Item Veto Act, an Act later invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York.10 Not-
withstanding the clear effort in Raines v. Byrd  to tighten standing requirements, 
Members of Congress continue to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a 
wide range of disputes with the Executive Branch. In United States v. Windsor (2013) 
(in which I was the Court-appointed amicus curiae asked to argue against the Court’s 
jurisdiction), the House of Representatives Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
asserted standing to intervene and appeal to defend the constitutionality of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act.11 One Justice, in dissent, accepted standing of the 
congressional advisory group;12 three others, also in dissent, rejected it;13 and the 
majority did not reach the question.14  
Significantly revised understandings of injury for standing purposes developed in 
order to accommodate new claims by environmental organizations and their mem-
bers for environmental and even aesthetic injuries.15 Thus, newly asserted forms of 
injury were recognized as such for standing purposes. But unlike the twentieth cen-
tury recognition of environmental harm as a judicially cognizable interest, often pro-
moted by public interest organizations that emerged in the twentieth century, 
Congress as an institution has been around since the Founding, as have the interests 
of its members in the due enforcement of the laws. What is novel here is not the 
institution nor the claim of an interest in how the laws are enforced (historically 
addressed through legislative oversight), but rather the tendency for Members of 
Congress to come into court over public disputes with other government offices 
rather than using other avenues of relief outside the courts to try to prevail in their 
positions.  
One recent example is the action by the House of Representatives at issue in U.S. 
House of Representatives v. Burwell,16 challenging the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act as inconsistent with the Appropriation Clause and constitutional 
provisions conferring the legislative power on Congress. Another fairly recent ex-
ample is Crawford v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,17 in which Senator Ron Paul, 
among other plaintiffs, challenged certain intergovernmental agreements as treaties 
requiring Senate approval.  
Such cases, part of a broader trend of governments, including legislative bodies 
or their members, resorting to the courts,18 might be seen as a healthy development, 
                                                                                                             
 
 10. 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). 
 11. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
 12. See id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 13. See id. at 2699–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14. See id. at 2688. 
 15. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992); United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 16. 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 17. No. 3:15-cv-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015). 
 18. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652, 2665 (2015); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–21 (2007). For cases in the 
lower courts, see, for example, New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1216–19 
(10th Cir. 2017); Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 F.3d 1207, 1214–17 (10th Cir. 2016); Texas v. 
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 
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consistent with developments in other countries towards resort to the courts for 
resolution of a wider range of constitutional disputes. It might be thought to benefit 
the rule of law by providing more certainty and clarity to disputed constitutional 
questions and by increasing the measures to secure executive compliance with law. 
It might also reflect the enhanced stature of the courts; or instead, the ease of using 
the courts to take a public position that will be politically beneficial.19 Or it might be 
taken as a sensible reaction to the growing power of the Executive Branch, with re-
sort to the courts to provide a rule of law check on abuse in executive and 
administrative departments.  
On the other hand, the trend might be viewed as an unhealthy symptom of, and 
contributor to, a declining faith in democratic politics, a willingness to use courts in 
lieu of constitutionally available political processes, and thereby further to empower 
courts that are, relative to constitutional courts elsewhere, untethered in any system-
atic way to the unfolding political contexts in which democratic constitutionalism 
lives. Legislative standing might be thought to detract from the capacities of the 
political processes to resolve important questions, if the courts routinely come to the 
rescue over political disagreements. And the perceived legitimacy of the courts might 
over the long run suffer, especially if their decisions come to be seen as no more than 
tools in political battles.  
Thus, the positive values of judicial resolution in enhancing the clarity of the law 
and restraining executive abuse must be weighed against the risks that the courts may 
choose wrong answers that do not help governance or that overall democratic func-
tioning will be impaired by increasing dependence on the courts to resolve disputes. 
This Essay is an effort to analyze and weigh these values and risks in several 
distinctive contexts involving claims of congressional standing.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND STANDING 
Standing is a question of constitutional law in the United States. Constitutional 
interpretation in the Supreme Court typically draws on several sources: text and 
original understandings; precedent and interpretation over time, including history 
outside of the courts; values and purposes of the constitutional provisions involved; 
and the consequences of alternative interpretations.20 How do these different sources 
bear on different kinds of legislative standing questions?  
Text: Article III’s language of “cases” and “controversies” is not self-explicating. 
History and precedent, as discussed below, should play an important role in their 
understanding. But the powers of other branches are more specific and are quite 
varied; the scope of those powers and what power is at issue should, as Professor  
                                                                                                             
 
906 (2016). 
 19. On credit-claiming postures of elected officials, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: 
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61–62 (2d ed. 2014).  
 20. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1987); Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-Valenced 
Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark 
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599, 599–601 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The United States: 
Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 7, 17–45 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
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Tara Grove has argued, matter in understanding questions of standing.21  
For example, the Court has stated that under the Take Care Clause, it is the 
Executive Branch that has the responsibility for carrying out the laws, including 
through litigation;22 legislative standing premised on broad claims that the President 
is violating the Take Care Clause might thus be thought inconsistent with this 
allocation of authority. However, where a state legislature’s (or legislators’) votes 
have been “completely nullified” in the Court’s view, standing has on rare occasion 
been upheld, where the injury asserted is to a constitutionally specified power to rat-
ify proposed amendments under Article V or to set “Times, Places and Manner” of 
congressional elections as provided in Article I, Section 4.23 As these areas suggest, 
standing analysis may thus vary depending on the particular substantive claim under 
distinct constitutional (or statutory) provisions.  
Precedent and History: Issues of legislative standing may arise both in suits 
brought by individual members in their own right and by a house or an entire legis-
lative body. Although precedent may play an important role in the development of 
constitutional law,24 relatively few Supreme Court cases involve legislative standing, 
and of these, even fewer address the standing of Congress or its members. There is 
surely no longstanding history of Congress or its houses bringing suit against other 
parts of the federal government or officers acting on its behalf.25 Indeed, the first case 
of which I am aware in which the Court suggested that Congress or its houses would 
have standing as such was decided in 1983: INS v. Chadha26 is frequently cited for 
the proposition that Congress has standing to defend the constitutionality of laws not 
defended by the Executive Branch. Despite dictum characterizing Congress as the 
appropriate party to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the Executive 
Branch does not do so, I will argue below that the case may be better understood as 
resting on Congress’s authority to defend its own asserted statutory prerogative to 
vote a “one-house veto” on agency action.27 
The Court’s most recent decision concerning the standing of members of 
Congress was in 1997. In Raines v. Byrd, the standing of individual members of 
Congress to bring suit to contest the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act was 
rejected.28 The Court found that the legislators (who had voted against the Act) 
lacked the necessary personal stake in the outcome.29 Responding to the claim that 
                                                                                                             
 
 21. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
1311 (2014). 
 22. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135–41 (1976) (per curiam). 
 23. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 
438–41 (1939). For further discussion of Coleman, see infra note 48 and infra notes 30–31, 
33, 39, 101 and accompanying text. 
 24. See generally DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 25. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113–14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Historically, 
political disputes between Members of the Legislative and the Executive Branches were 
resolved without resort to the courts.”). 
 26. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 112–133. 
 28. See 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
 29. See id. at 818–20 (discussing the “personal” stake requirement).  
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the Act diminished the effect of their votes for future legislation, the Court drew a 
distinction between such claims and those of state legislators in the 1939 decision in 
Coleman v. Miller.30 In Coleman, the votes of half the members of the Kansas Senate 
against ratifying a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution would, on their 
theory that the lieutenant governor was not allowed to vote, have been “virtually held 
for naught,”31 or, as described by Raines v. Byrd, “completely nullified,” by giving 
effect to the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in support of ratification.32 
Coleman, the Raines Court wrote, “stands (at most) for the proposition that 
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific 
legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does 
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”33 
Raines’ treatment of Coleman suggests that cases addressing the requirements for 
state legislator standing would also be applied, as minimal criteria, to claims of stand-
ing by Members of Congress.  
Drawing on the history of constitutional collisions between Congress and 
Presidents over time, Raines v. Byrd concluded that congressional attempts to litigate 
                                                                                                             
 
 30. See id. at 821–24 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)). Raines v. Byrd 
also suggested a distinction between claims personal to a particular legislator (“a prerogative 
of personal power”) and claims relating to the institutional “seat” of the legislator (as “trustee” 
for constituents), 521 U.S. at 821, a distinction subject to critique as a basis for determining 
injury for standing purposes. See, e.g., Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: 
The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1746–47 (1999). Had the Court 
meant to rest only on this distinction, however, it would have been unnecessary to distinguish 
Coleman. I therefore read Raines as resting on a more complex and nuanced set of factors. 
 31. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S at 438. 
 32. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 823. 
 33. Id. at 823 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent District Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), went further in its attempt 
to discredit Coleman as “a peculiar case that may well stand for nothing”:  
[There were] two votes to affirm on the merits, two to reverse on the merits 
(without discussing standing) and four to dismiss for lack of standing. Justice 
Stanley Reed, who was on the Court and apparently participated in the case, is 
not mentioned in any of the opinions recorded in the United States Reports. So, 
in order to find Coleman a binding precedent on standing, rather than a 4–to–4 
standoff, one must assume that Justice Reed voted with Hughes. There is some 
reason to make that assumption: The four Justices rejecting standing went on to 
discuss the merits, because “the ruling of the Court just announced removes from 
the case the question of petitioners’ standing to sue.” 307 U.S. at 456 (Black, J., 
concurring). But then again, if nine Justices participated, how could it be that on 
one of the two issues in the case the Court was “equally divided and therefore . . 
. expresse[d] no opinion”? Id. at 447. A pretty shaky foundation for a significant 
precedential ruling. . . . And even under the most generous assumptions, since 
the Court’s judgment on the issue it resolved rested on the ground that that issue 
presented a political question—which is itself a rejection of jurisdiction, 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)—Coleman’s discussion of the 
additional jurisdictional issue of standing was quite superfluous and arguably 
nothing but dictum. The peculiar decision in Coleman should be charitably 
ignored. 
Id. at 2696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the dispute were contrary to historical experience. The Court’s opinion discussed at 
length the Tenure in Office Act, whose constitutionality was at issue in the impeach-
ment proceedings of President Andrew Johnson in a disagreement between the 
political branches that continued for more than another half century before it was 
resolved in a lawsuit brought by a person claiming to have been unlawfully removed 
from office.34 Moreover, even though the Line Item Veto Act had specifically 
authorized suits by individual Members of Congress to challenge its constitutional-
ity, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had not been authorized by their houses to bring 
the lawsuit.35 And further, as the Court also noted, in this case Congress had other 
remedies to vindicate its interests—including repeal of the Act or exempting appro-
priations bills from its reach.36 Finally, it noted, nothing foreclosed a challenge to the 
Act by someone who suffered judicially cognizable injury under it.37 In light of the 
multiple factors considered, it is thus uncertain how broadly or narrowly to read 
Raines with respect to standing by congressional actors.38  
                                                                                                             
 
 34. See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 826–28; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52 (1926). 
 35. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829. While noting this factor, the Court did not elaborate 
on its implications.  
 36. Id. at 829; cf. Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1058 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating, 
in denying standing to congressional plaintiffs challenging alleged failure to enforce 
immigration laws, that although the existence of other remedies is not relevant to standing, the 
parties might have a remedy through the legislative process). 
 37. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829.  
 38. The D.C. Circuit has had a series of important decisions on legislative standing, 
several of which are discussed in Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Chenoweth read Raines as a major curtailment of the possibility of congressional standing, 
requiring a showing of “complete nullification” in order to sustain congressional standing, and 
thus casting doubt on the reasoning in earlier D.C. Circuit decisions. Id. at 117. Judge Tatel, 
while agreeing that under Raines congressional plaintiffs lacked standing in Chenoweth to 
challenge the validity of various executive orders designed to protect rivers, wrote separately 
to say that the Chenoweth majority read Raines too broadly. I quote at length from his opinion, 
as it also provides a brief summary of prior standing cases in the circuit:  
[U]nlike appellants, the legislators in Kennedy and Moore challenged alleged 
constitutional defects in the way specific pieces of legislation were passed or 
defeated. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 951–53 (revenue-raising bill allegedly 
originated in the Senate, not the House); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434–36 (allegedly 
unconstitutional presidential pocket veto of legislation passed by Congress). 
Contrary to appellants’ claim that they have been “denied the ‘right[] to 
participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution,’” 
Appellant’s Br. at 16 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 951), they can point to no 
defect in any “discrete aspect of the process by which a bill becomes law (the 
actual vote on the legislation) [or] those post-enactment events denying the bill’s 
status as law,” Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This case 
is therefore indistinguishable from and controlled by United Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984). There, as here, 
a Member of Congress challenged the legality of an executive order, claiming 
that it was promulgated without congressional or constitutional authorization. 
See id. at 1381–82. We held that the Member lacked standing because he raised 
only “‘a generalized grievance about the conduct of government, not a claim 
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Indeed, whether the “complete nullification” theory would support congressional 
standing at all is itself unclear; the Court’s most recent decision upholding the stand-
ing of a state legislature on this basis specifically cautioned that “a suit between 
Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent 
here.”39 In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission,40 the Court found that the State Legislature had standing to challenge a 
ballot initiative requiring that districting be done by an independent commission. 
This ballot initiative, the Legislature alleged, completely stripped it of its asserted 
right under the U.S. Constitution to do districting directly. If the Arizona Legislature 
were correct on the merits of its constitutional claim, then the action complained of 
would have completely nullified their right to vote, bringing it within the standing 
rule of Coleman v. Miller.41  
As this brief survey suggests, legislative standing has been upheld thus far only 
in quite limited circumstances; little support exists in precedent or history for the 
Congress, as a legislative body, to sue the Executive Branch as a general matter over 
constitutional issues.  
                                                                                                             
 
founded on injury to the legislator by distortion of the process by which a bill 
becomes law.’” Id. at 1382 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 952); see also Daughtrey 
v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting the argument that 
legislators have standing to challenge executive nonenforcement of an act as a 
usurpation of the legislative right to enact repealing legislation); Harrington, 553 
F.2d at 211 (rejecting the argument that a legislator has standing to challenge 
allegedly illegal CIA activities as an impairment of his prospective votes on 
related legislation).  
Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 117–18 (Tatel, J., concurring). For cases in other circuits, see, for 
example, Hansen v. Nat’l Comm’n on the Observance of Int’l Women’s Year, 628 F.2d 533, 
534 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The injury alleged by appellant is an injury which he suffers along with 
all other citizens of the United States. He has not presented any facts which show he has 
sustained or is imminently in danger of sustaining an actual personal injury.”); Harrington v. 
Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (rejecting legislator standing to challenge 
expenditures for combat in other countries in alleged violation of law); see also Baird v. 
Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting state legislators’ challenge to approval 
by Secretary of Interior of gaming compacts between the state and Indian tribe; finding claim 
of injury due to use of concurrent resolution voting procedure in the legislature (majority of 
those present) rather than a more rigorous procedure (majority of all legislators) was only a 
generalized grievance, and also rejecting theory of “complete nullification” because only two 
legislators were party plaintiffs and their votes alone would not have been sufficient to defeat 
the measure).  
 39. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 
n.12 (2015); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 819–20 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been 
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether 
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was 
unconstitutional.”); id. at 824 n.8 (noting that it did not need to decide whether Coleman was 
distinguishable in additional ways, including that it did not pose the separation of powers 
concerns that congressional standing does); id. at 832 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that Coleman may be distinguishable because the action by state senators 
did not pose federal separation of powers concerns).  
 40. 135 S. Ct. 2652. 
 41. See id. at 2665–66. 
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But, it must be acknowledged, this approach is not a necessary feature of courts 
engaged in constitutional review. Reasonably well-functioning systems of 
constitutional democracy, as in France or Germany, authorize parts of the legislature 
to challenge the constitutionality of statutes or, in the case of Germany, to resolve 
jurisdictional disputes between two organs of the federal government, before the con-
stitutional court.42 In such countries there is typically a specific constitutional 
provision contemplating or authorizing such suits. There is no such provision in the 
U.S. Constitution. U.S. history and precedent both regard the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts as more narrow. Indeed, even where Congress has conferred standing 
on private parties, the Court has found limits on its ability to do so, as in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.43  
Values:  Constitutional values exist on both sides of many questions of standing. 
A fundamental value in U.S. constitutionalism is the rule of law: “The government 
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men.”44 Yet the values of representative democracy are also central to U.S. 
constitutionalism; these values contemplate self-governance by the people through 
their elected representatives. There are many ways in which these values can be 
reconciled, including through forms of deference by courts to the decisions of elected 
branches. But justiciability limits, including standing, have been viewed as playing 
a role in limiting the occasions of judicial intervention to situations where there has 
been a specific injury to particular persons.45 
Purpose and Consequence: Constitutional adjudication frequently invokes both 
the general purposes of constitutional provisions or doctrines and a concern for the 
consequences of alternative interpretation. Standing requirements are sometimes 
justified as ensuring that the parties most directly affected should be those who 
litigate,46 a requirement that is also sometimes linked to the idea that courts 
                                                                                                             
 
 42. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547–
83 (3d ed. 2014). There are systems that permit individuals who have only an ideological 
interest in a matter to challenge a set of allegedly unconstitutional conditions, as in India. Id. 
at 747–64.  
 43. 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
 44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 45.  See supra text accompanying note 29 (referring to the concrete injury requirement). 
Thus, in Marbury, the Court emphasized the importance of an individual claim of injury: “The 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
 46. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case 
or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). For an argument in favor of 
congressional standing in separation of powers disputes on the grounds that Members of 
Congress know more and are better situated concretely to explicate the interest at stake, see 
Note, supra note 30, at 1754. Members of Congress, however, may also have stronger 
incentives to litigate for partisan political purposes, regardless of the longer term institutional 
interests of their organ of government. Cf. Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 n.4 
(D.D.C. 2011) (“While there may conceivably be some political benefit in suing the President 
and the Secretary of Defense, in light of shrinking judicial budgets, scarce judicial resources, 
and a heavy caseload, the Court finds it frustrating to expend time and effort adjudicating the 
relitigation of settled questions of law.”). 
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adjudicate best when they see the concrete implications of challenged action in par-
ticular cases affecting particular persons. Standing is one of several “justiciability” 
doctrines found implicit in the case or controversy requirements of Article III. Three 
sets of purposes are commonly identified for these justiciability limits more gener-
ally: first, lack of judicial competence or concerns for how courts are best able to 
adjudicate; second, exclusive competence in another branch; and third, avoiding 
harms to courts and political branches from courts adjudicating too wide a span of 
sensitive public law disputes involving conflict between the courts and other 
branches of government.  
Lack of Judicial Competence: The concrete injury requirement, the Court has 
said, helps preserve the separation of powers because courts lack the competence to 
resolve constitutional issues abstractly,47 or are more likely to do a good job if they 
are adjudicating legal issues in concrete context. This argument may be tied to a 
broader concept of how courts should decide cases48—with attention to particular 
facts, with a kind of decisional humility that allows a set of decisions on a variety of 
facts to accumulate incrementally. But the Court has frequently decided 
constitutional questions in close to abstract settings, for example, when it adjudicates 
facial challenges to newly enacted laws, before they are enforced against particular 
persons.49 While the idea of judicial modesty that lies behind the competence claim 
has appeal, it is not always applied.  
Exclusive Competence Elsewhere: A second set of reasons underlying 
justiciability limits is that other branches have exclusive competence over a question. 
An example: A challenge by a federal judge removed from office by impeachment 
and conviction to the procedures used by the Senate in conducting his trial was found 
nonjusticiable because of the Senate’s exclusive competence over the trial of im-
peachments.50 Concerns for the competence of other branches sometimes surface in 
standing cases: in Allen v. Wright,51 the Court implied that where there is no 
disagreement about the controlling legal norm, but only about its execution, standing 
should be more strictly applied to avoid judicial entanglement in the work of the 
Executive Branch.52 
                                                                                                             
 
 47. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576–77. 
 48. Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“The abstract nature of the harm—for 
example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed—deprives the case of the 
concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were ‘the traditional concern 
of the courts at Westminster,’ Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and 
which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory 
opinion.”).  
 49. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 50. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993).  
 51. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 52. See id. at 759–60 (discussing separation of powers in context of concerns about 
plaintiffs “challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the 
particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations”). In Wright, the IRS 
did not argue that it had no obligation to avoid giving tax exemptions to racist schools, but 
rather claimed that its enforcement method was adequate to the goal; plaintiffs disagreed. See 
id. at 744–45 (“Respondents allege that, despite the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status 
to racially discriminatory private schools and despite the IRS guidelines and procedures for 
implementing that policy, some of the tax-exempt racially segregated private schools created 
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Reducing Occasions for Judicial Review and Confrontations with Political 
Branches: A third set of reasons for the justiciability requirements is that they reduce 
the number of occasions where the Court must confront the political branches of the 
federal government.53 Why is this desirable? What are the potential harms of such 
confrontations? And are those harms exacerbated when the confrontations involve 
head-on collisions in litigation directly between Congress or parts thereof and the 
Executive Branch? 
One kind of concern is that, despite traditions of obedience to the Court’s judg-
ments, the Court has to be careful, as a matter of judicial statesmanship, in not over-
drawing the reservoir of diffuse support for its institutional role;54 issuing rulings that 
are ignored or defied, it is thought, may impair the court’s effectiveness more 
generally. Political scientists sometimes speak of constitutional courts operating 
within a zone of tolerance of those who hold political power.55 If political branches 
cease accepting the Court’s judgments because they exceed their tolerances or those 
of a majority of the public, then the rule of law will suffer a major blow. The history 
of intergovernmental litigation in the United States has involved some moments of 
genuine uncertainty over compliance.56  
Another kind of risk is that the Court might receive too much respect, on too many 
issues, to the detriment of democratic decision making and wise policy making. We 
                                                                                                             
 
or expanded in desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory policies.”); see also 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated 
public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ 
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the 
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,’ Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, ‘to assume 
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,’ and to 
become ‘“virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 53. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552–53 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[S]tanding doctrine keeps courts out of political disputes by denying private 
litigants the right to test the abstract legality of government action. See Schlesinger, supra, at 
222. And by limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement authority to private 
plaintiffs and the courts, standing doctrine preserves executive discretion.”). 
 54. On diffuse support, see, for example, Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The 
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); Walter F. 
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Explaining Diffuse Support for the United States Supreme 
Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037 (1974). 
 55. For the discussion of the idea of “tolerance” intervals, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight 
& Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance 
of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001).  
 56. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (ordering the President to turn 
over what turned out to be incriminating tapes in an action brought by a specially appointed 
federal public prosecutor and the President); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
286–87 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the challenges of enforcing judgments in litigation involving 
states, and referring to one of several Supreme Court decisions involving the struggle over 
many years and iterations of litigation to enforce the Court’s judgment that West Virginia pay 
a debt owed to Virginia). 
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might think of this as a risk of judicial supersupremacy.57 The Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court are, we may assume, very smart lawyers, but they are only nine in 
number, and they are not necessarily practiced in the art of actual governance. 
Moreover, U.S. Article III judges, including the Supreme Court Justices, serve terms 
that are indefinite, unlike the justices of well-known constitutional courts who serve 
time-limited terms (e.g., in Germany or South Africa, with twelve-year terms), and 
unlike the justices of other well-known high courts that decide constitutional 
questions who serve until a stated retirement age (e.g., Australia, age seventy, or 
Canada, age seventy-five). The absence of regular replacement through mandatory 
retirement or term limits compounds the challenges for a court deciding important 
constitutional questions.58 
The risks of incorrect decisions may be particularly high with respect to separation 
of powers issues. Recent scholarly work suggests that the effect of a particular 
separation of powers issue on the overall distribution of governing powers is very 
difficult to determine;59 other scholarly work on the appropriations process suggests 
that since 1789 it has been subject to a complex set of customs not revealed simply 
by reading the statutes.60 Such work may imply that courts’ competence to get correct 
answers in these areas of interbranch relations is at its weakest in resolving these 
issues.  
A third kind of risk from repeated adjudication of disputes between the two 
elected branches, especially when those two branches or members thereof are the 
contesting parties in a litigation,61 is that Congress may be encouraged in its current 
                                                                                                             
 
 57. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the 
Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 
2455 (1998) (discussing other federal courts’ doctrines reflecting the Court’s own 
“supersupremacy”). 
 58. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 538–40 (showing that justices in Germany 
and South Africa also face mandatory retirement, which may shorten the term in office); see 
also Vicki C. Jackson, Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing and the Institutional 
Framework of Article III: A Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1783, 1800–
04 (2016) (exploring structural differences, including in terms served and regularity of 
replacement, the justices’ prior experience in government, and ease of constitutional 
amendment, between the U.S. Supreme Court and other constitutional courts).  
 59. See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for 
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Discounting Accountability, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents 
/16_10_10%20Nicholas%20Stephanopoulos_Discounting%20Accountability.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4W6-2YJX] (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that the Court’s 
assumptions about what constitutional interpretations will increase electoral accountability 
may be mistaken or unproven); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1674 (2014) (arguing against judicial enforcement of constitutional 
rules claimed to prohibit innovations agreed on between Congress and the President because 
of “skeptic[ism] that courts will identify accurately instances in which institutional bargains 
go too far”). 
 60. See LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF 
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES (Archon Books 1971) (1943). 
 61.  Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833–34 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (indicating that graver separation of powers concerns for the role of courts are posed 
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disinclination to take the responsibility of governance seriously. As Professor James 
Bradley Thayer argued long ago, too much judicial oversight can lead to a sapping 
of a sense of constitutional and political responsibility in the elected branches.62 His 
article, written in 1893, suggested that legislators might act less responsibly if they 
believe that the Court will stand at the ready to correct their excesses and failures of 
due consideration.  
Some observers may argue that the breakdown of congressional norms (such as 
respect for the opposition, or commitment to regular legislative process in 
lawmaking) and the rise of legislative gridlock provide reasons for the courts to be 
more active, to view more cases as justiciable. How does a breakdown in the 
legislative process relate to justiciability and more specifically to standing? A leading 
defense of the Court’s decisions in the two Bush v. Gore cases63 is that chaos would 
have ensued without the Court’s intervention.64 This defense necessarily turns on the 
idea that the procedures of the Twelfth Amendment for congressional resolution of 
disputed votes, arguably applicable to all contests over electoral votes for President,65 
were no longer controlling or practicable.66 I am not convinced that this was correct, 
nor am I convinced by similar arguments for recognizing congressional standing as 
a response to legislative dysfunctionality. 
It is a fundamental obligation of elected democratic governments to govern.67 
While the complex filters of the legislative process were deliberately designed to 
                                                                                                             
 
in litigation brought by Members of Congress against the Executive Branch than in a suit by 
other affected persons). 
 62. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 63. See Bush v. Gore (Bush II), 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (ending state-ordered recount 
based on the Equal Protection Clause); Bush v. Palm Beach Co. Canvassing Bd. (Bush I), 531 
U.S. 70 (2000) (vacating state court decision that had required a recount and remanding for 
clarification). 
 64. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the 
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49–53 (2001). 
 65. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 278–79 (2002) (“[T]he 
text of the Constitution vests authority with the state legislatures to select electors and with 
Congress to count the votes and to select the President in the event that no candidate commands 
a majority”; “[T]he text of Article II, Section 1 itself appears to give Congress the ability to 
determine whether a state judiciary has overstepped its bounds and improperly interfered with 
the state legislature’s authority under Article II to determine the manner in which electors are 
chosen.”); see generally id. at 277–95. Professor Barkow does not argue that the Equal 
Protection claim, which was the basis for the Bush II per curiam opinion, was foreclosed by 
the political question doctrine. Id. at 276 n.212. 
 66. Id. at 275 (finding surprising the Court’s failure even to consider the political question 
doctrine in Bush I, notwithstanding parties’ failure to raise it, and treating the decline of the 
political question doctrine as reflective of a troubling tendency of the Court to believe itself 
the only branch capable of resolving constitutional controversies). 
 67. See, e.g., Mark E. Warren & Jane Mansbridge with André Bächtiger et al.,  
Deliberative Negotiation, in POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 141 (Jane Mansbridge & 
Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2015); Gillian Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV L. REV. 1, 85–87 (2017) 
(implying that the Constitution requires “effective governance”); see also N.W. BARBER, THE 
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serve as a check on unwise or unconstitutional action, they were not intended as a 
block to governance; indeed, the Framers were concerned to create a more functional, 
more effective national government than had existed under the Articles of 
Confederation. As Justice Robert Jackson once wrote about “[t]he actual art of 
governing under our Constitution,” it “cannot conform to judicial definitions of the 
power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it 
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government.”68  
Arguments for expanded legislative standing based on the breakdown of 
congressional processes may instead be indicative of reasons for caution in 
entertaining novel theories of legislative standing.69 To elaborate: a court that devotes 
much of its decisional authority to head-on conflict between the two elected branches 
risks angering each in ways that over the long run may weaken support for the value 
of judicial independence.70 This occurred in the first Russian Constitutional Court,71 
although, given how well established our federal courts are, that danger (if it exists) 
is one for the long run, not the short run. 
Moreover, a major problem in the Congress—and in U.S. society—has been a 
loss of commitment to the value of compromise.72 This loss of commitment to 
compromise as a basic tool in representative democracy contributes substantially to 
various pathologies in the national political process. Knowing that the Court will step 
in to resolve disputes may be more likely to diminish than to enhance the willingness 
of the legislative branch to engage in compromise. The ability to forge and enforce 
compromises is an essential aspect of any democratic government in a complex 
society. To the extent that the Court entertains jurisdiction to decide cases—even 
cases raising real constitutional questions—that are essentially disputes between the 
political branches, where no individual or entity outside those branches claims injury, 
it may encourage irresponsibility and ideological posturing in the political branches, 
rather than encouraging a spirit of compromise and working-it-out-edness. 
To be sure, there are countervailing arguments. Perhaps we are at a pass where 
judicial intervention has become essential to clarify the ground rules of the national 
                                                                                                             
 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM  (forthcoming Aug. 2018) (arguing, in a chapter on 
separation of powers, that the separation of powers in a state should ordinarily be structured 
to promote cooperation between its different parts and that legislatures are needed for a state 
to function successfully by testing expert opinion, setting broad policy and exercising 
oversight of plans for implementing policy). 
 68. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). I am not related in any way to Justice Jackson. 
 69. Cf. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) 
(arguing that the federal judiciary should not adjudicate disputes over constitutional powers as 
between Congress and the President, but should instead leave such issues to the political 
process). 
 70. See supra note 61 (citing Souter concurrence in Raines for the point that direct 
interbranch conflict poses more of a threat to the role of courts than privately initiated suits). 
 71. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 792–804.  
 72. See Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role 
Obligations of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1717, 1765–67 (2016). 
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political process in the midst of current disputes for the guidance of members of the 
different branches.73 But to so conclude would mark a serious departure from existing 
understandings, with risks to both courts and politics. The question of standing in 
any particular dispute brought by members of one branch against another, this Essay 
suggests, should be approached with an attitude of caution, mindful of both the rule-
of-law values served in settling the issue but also of the potential risks in looking to 
courts to provide such settlement. And, despite the many virtues of single factor or 
rule-based theories, this Essay argues rather for a more nuanced approach based on 
multiple factors, acknowledging both the importance of precedent and the 
complexity of the factors that should be considered in resolving questions of 
justiciability in the context of interbranch litigation. 
Traditionally, what independent Article III courts have been most needed for has 
been the protection of individuals from injury arising out of violations of rights or 
structural parts of the Constitution.74 It is the rights and interests of persons or entities 
outside of the political power centers of government that even well-functioning 
majoritarian systems are likely at times to abuse or overlook. And it is for the 
protection of those rights and interests that the Court should be most willing to press 
political tolerances and spend its reservoirs of diffuse support. Indeed, individual 
standing could, and perhaps should, be broadened to the end of making judicial 
review more available where such individual rights and interests are at stake. As I 
have elsewhere argued, some of the Court’s decisions denying individual standing to 
challenge government action have been wrong and harmful, a form of self-restraint 
that advances neither democratic self-government nor the respect for rights that a 
well-functioning constitutional democracy requires.75 But resolving constitutional 
conflicts of a partisan character between members of different branches, which those 
                                                                                                             
 
 73. Cf. Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
124, 134–41, 144–48 (2014) (arguing for expanding standing in cases involving pure public 
law disputes, generally involving separation of powers issues, under a constitutional rule). 
 74. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)] lies in the protection it has afforded the 
constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive 
or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision 
of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and 
has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial 
review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis 
rests.”). Individuals’ rights and interests are protected not only by explicit rights provisions 
but also by more structural elements of the Constitution. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 75. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error 
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 133 (2014). Even under existing doctrine, cases like 
Richardson could well come out differently were Congress to enact legislation to implement 
the Constitution’s Statement and Accounts Clause and authorize individuals to sue to obtain 
information that they claim is required to be made public. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 
(1998); see also infra note 218 (noting Lyons and Spokeo as cases where the Court was too 
narrow in defining individual standing). 
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other branches are capable of resolving themselves and for which each has major 
tools of power at their disposal, bears a higher set of risks to the constitutional system. 
In this light, I now analyze several different kinds of claims that might be brought 
by congressional plaintiffs, having in mind the benefits of not expanding 
congressional standing too broadly while preserving the capacity of courts to help 
secure constitutional rule of law. 
III. LEGISLATIVE STANDING IN PARTICULAR SETTINGS 
The concerns raised above do not apply themselves to particular categories of 
claims for legislative standing. The following sections seek to do so, without 
necessarily resolving close questions. Although reasonable arguments for 
substantially expanding congressional standing exist, I urge a more cautious 
approach to expanding congressional standing beyond existing parameters. 
The Court’s formal doctrine for establishing standing has solidified around three 
elements said to be derived from the Constitution: there must be a concrete injury 
(not a generalized grievance), caused by or traceable to the conduct complained of, 
and redressable by the judicial relief sought.76 In some cases, particular Members of 
Congress can assert a personal injury of the kind clearly presenting a sufficiently 
concrete and particularized injury for purposes of  “standing,” as discussed in Part 
III.A below. But most of the time the kinds of cases in which congressional actors 
invoke the Article III courts’ jurisdiction involve claims of institutional injuries. In 
cases involving the institutional interests of Members or parts of Congress, these 
three constitutional components will not by themselves prove especially useful in 
distinguishing among cases in which congressional parties invoke federal courts’ 
jurisdiction. More general separation of powers concerns, relying on the ability of 
the other branches to resolve their disputes through political mechanisms, come into 
play. 
To begin with, a perfectly reasonable argument could be made for recognizing 
legislative standing quite broadly. There is no conceptual difficulty in identifying 
distinctive injuries for legislators, in their capacity as legislators, in cases involving 
the constitutionality of federal laws or executive branch action: there is something 
special about being an elected member of the legislative branch that, it can be argued, 
distinguishes their claims of injury from those of the general public.77 Indeed, federal 
                                                                                                             
 
 76. E.g., Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Although the ban on 
“generalized grievances” has sometimes been identified as a “prudential” (rather than 
“constitutional”) factor, it has been used to help define the (constitutional) concrete injury 
requirement. See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (“The only 
injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been 
followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the 
conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”). 
 77. Moreover, there is a close relationship between how constitutional injury is defined 
and the elements of redressability and causation; injuries to Members of Congress defined by 
virtue of their special status in government could be crafted in such a way as to secure these 
other elements. In Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman’s case (discussed infra note 78), for example, if 
her injury were the loss of opportunity to vote on whether the war should continue, the 
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courts in the early 1970s sometimes accepted such claims of standing—in at least 
one case, by a single Member of Congress who was challenging the constitutionality 
of the spread of the war in Vietnam into bombing of targets in Cambodia.78 Where 
such an institutional injury is alleged, moreover, the claim is likely to meet causation 
and redressability requirements, since the injury would be caused by the assertedly 
unlawful conduct complained of and would be redressed by a judicial declaration of 
invalidity, which the government would presumably honor.79 But the Court has been 
skeptical of such claims of institutional injury, for reasons not unrelated to the 
concerns for democracy and the federal courts’ role therein raised above.  
In Raines v. Byrd,80 the Court distinguished between “personal” claims of injury, 
such as those suffered by the plaintiff in Powell v McCormack,81 who alleged that 
                                                                                                             
 
President’s failure to seek such a vote could be treated as the cause of the injury, and a judicial 
declaration of rights indicating that she and other Members must vote to authorize hostilities 
could be viewed as likely to redress the injury. 
 78. See Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (“Plaintiff qua 
Congresswoman does not merely suffer in some indefinite way in common with people 
generally. She is a member of a specific and narrowly defined group—the House of 
Representatives. As a Congresswoman, plaintiff is called upon to appropriate funds for 
military operations, raise an army, and declare war. Additionally, plaintiff has a continuing 
responsibility to insure the checks and balances of our democracy through the use of 
impeachment. When a plaintiff is a member of a narrowly defined group, which has been more 
directly affected by the conduct in question than has the general population, the test for 
standing should be met.”) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals reversed, on justiciablity 
grounds. It found her claim barred by the political question doctrine, but did not exclude the 
possible justiciability of other war-related claims involving “clear abuse amounting to bad 
faith.” See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308–09, 1311–12 (2d Cir. 1973). It 
quoted from Judge Wyzanski’s opinion in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 
1973):  
Even if the necessary facts were to be laid before it, a court would not substitute 
its judgment for that of the President, who has an unusually wide measure of 
discretion in this area, and who should not be judicially condemned except in a 
case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Otherwise a court would be ignoring 
the delicacies of diplomatic negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the best 
solution of an international conflict, and the scope which in foreign affairs must 
be allowed to the President if this country is to play a responsible role in the 
council of the nations.  
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d at 1311–12. The Court of Appeals also rejected Holtzman’s 
standing (over Judge Oakes’ dissent): it found that she was not denied the right to vote or 
debate; if her vote was ineffective, it was due to the contrary votes of her colleagues. See id. 
at 1315. And her argument that a determination of illegality would be useful in any 
impeachment proceedings, the court said, would require the federal courts to give an 
essentially advisory opinion, prohibited by Article III. See id. (I was a legislative intern in Rep. 
Holtzman’s office for part of the summer of 1973.) 
 79. But cf. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1992) (Scalia, J., for a 
plurality) (suggesting that redressability would be defeated by the possibility that a federal 
agency not a party to the litigation would not consider itself bound by a final judgment on an 
issue of federal law).  
 80. 521 U.S. 811, 820–21 (1997). 
 81. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
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Congress had wrongfully refused to seat him notwithstanding his election, and 
“institutional” claims of injury to Members of Congress, which are considerably 
more difficult to make out. As noted earlier, the Court in Raines rejected the standing 
of several Members of Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, which, they 
claimed, had the effect of unconstitutionally diminishing the power of their votes in 
Congress; the mere enactment of the statute, the Court said, did not of itself effect 
such a diminishment,82 and Congress had it within its grasp to rectify any use made 
by Presidents of the purported authority to cancel spending programs.83 In light of 
Raines, respect for precedent suggests that a narrower definition of injury would need 
to be used in defining congressional standing than one premised on the special status 
of Members of Congress as lawmakers or public representatives.84 
The Court’s standing case law has been widely described and frequently critiqued 
for inconsistency. As noted above, it would not be difficult to construct arguments 
for expansive congressional standing. But all else being equal, theories of standing 
that comport with the main thrust of prior cases are to be preferred to those that strike 
out entirely anew, in light of what Dworkin called “fit,”85 and that others might see 
as a kind of Burkean incrementalism.86 In light of such concerns for “fit” and 
concerns not to undermine congressional capacities for using political mechanisms 
to resolve disputes, a narrower compass of legislative standing should be drawn. 
With this in mind, I propose below several factors to guide thinking about legislative 
standing (beyond the arguably special injury suffered by Members of Congress 
through asserted failures of federal officers to carry out or comply with the law and 
in addition to the distinction between “personal” and “institutional” injury).  
First, how have claims similar to the one at issue been dealt with in the past? 
History cannot be dispositive, of course;87 standing itself was, according to many 
scholars, only invented in the mid-twentieth century, and its parameters have shown 
considerable flexibility in responding to and allowing new types of claims, for 
example, of environmental harm. But a pattern of handling particular disputes 
through political processes, as was discussed in Raines, is not irrelevant.  
                                                                                                             
 
 82. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 824–26. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the judgment, finding 
the issue of standing more “debatable” than did the majority, but concluding that general 
separation of powers concerns supported finding the case nonjusticiable, as an interbranch and 
intrabranch dispute intervention in which “would risk damaging the public confidence that is 
vital to the functioning of the Judicial Branch by embroiling the federal courts in a power 
contest nearly at the height of its political tension.” Id. at 830, 833 (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (citation omitted). 
  85. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 67–68 (1986). 
 86. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 24; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. 
L. Rev. 353, 356 (2006); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political 
Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). 
 87. Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2537, 2538 (1998) (“[P]roperly to understand when particular remedies are constitutionally 
required, one must distill somewhat broader remedial principles from our constitutional text, 
structure, and tradition than can be drawn either from history or from a particular constitutional 
clause.”). 
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Second, is the claimed injury one that could be redressed by means available to 
Congress, without resort to the courts, through oversight processes, control of 
appropriations, or even by impeachment? In Raines v. Byrd, the Court emphasized 
the many mechanisms that exist under the Constitution for Congress and its Members 
to express disagreement with the Executive88: Congress may hold oversight hearings, 
or withhold consideration of nominees, or impose constraints on the use of 
appropriated funds.89 As others have noted, impeachment may also be available to 
redress some forms of alleged Executive wrongdoing.90 The availability of effective 
political tools secured by the Constitution’s allocations of powers may bear on 
whether the claim should be viewed as justiciable.91  
Third, are there likely to be individuals or entities outside of Congress that would 
suffer concrete injury and could thus raise the challenge without putting the Court 
directly into the position of having to reject either Congress’s or the Executive 
Branch’s positions as party litigants? Even when a federal statute is challenged by 
private persons, separation of powers concerns may inform the Court’s adjudication 
of the constitutionality of the action of another branch.92 But where the parties to the 
litigation are themselves parts of the two other branches, the constitutional stakes are 
inevitably heightened, and the risks to the courts that much greater.93 To be sure, the 
Court has not always been hospitable to the proposition—in cases brought by citizens 
or taxpayers—that the absence of other parties with standing should count in any way 
                                                                                                             
 
 88. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 819–20, 826–29. 
 89. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 
1229 (1993). 
 90. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Congress can use powers, like impeachment, if it disagrees with Executive enforcement 
decisions). Some suggest that impeachment is always available as a tool in disputes between 
Congress and the President and thus that reliance on its availability as an alternative remedy 
would always defeat congressional standing to challenge executive action. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 363 
(2015). But history suggests that enough Members of Congress to make a difference would 
take seriously the substantive constitutional limitations on impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 4 (limiting impeachment and removal from office to “Treason, Bribery, and other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors”); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between 
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO L.J. 2193, 2219–20 (1998)   
(arguing that impeachable acts are not simply whatever will motivate a partisan vote but 
involve serious misconduct in breach of the public trust). 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 92. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–61 (1984). 
 93. See supra note 84; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 833–34 (Souter, J. concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that although “a suit challenging the constitutionality of this Act brought 
by a party from outside the Federal Government would also involve the Court in resolving the 
dispute over the allocation of power between the political branches, it would expose the 
Judicial Branch to a lesser risk” than a suit brought by Members of Congress against the 
Executive Branch, because “[d]eciding a suit to vindicate an interest outside the Government 
raises no specter of judicial readiness to enlist on one side of a political tug-of-war, since ‘the 
propriety of such action by a federal court has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137 (1803)’”); see also Nash, supra note 90, at 388 (arguing that likelihood of private 
party standing on a claim would be prudential reason to deny standing to a congressional 
plaintiff).  
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towards recognizing the plaintiffs’ standing.94 However, in Raines the Court noted 
that its decision did not “foreclose[] . . . constitutional challenge” by another plaintiff 
as a factor that supported its conclusion that the congressional plaintiffs lacked 
standing.95 The Court’s language—that its decision did not “foreclose” adjudication 
of the  constitutional validity of the statute with a proper party plaintiff—suggests 
that the rule-of-law function played by judicial resolution of the issue could someday 
be achieved.  
Fourth, has the Congress as a whole through legislation, or the appropriate house 
or committee by resolution, properly authorized the litigation?96 The Court has noted 
the presence or absence of authorization to sue as bearing on legislative standing, in 
both cases involving state legislators and Members of Congress.97 In Raines, the 
Court specifically noted and thus presumably attached significance to the fact that 
plaintiffs had “not been authorized to represent their respective Houses,”98 even 
though the legislation in question had authorized any member of the Congress to 
bring an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act.99 Authorization for 
individual Members of Congress to sue was not enough to overcome what the Court 
viewed as an absence of the kind of concrete, specific institutional injury needed to 
sustain standing. Moreover, the Court has not hesitated to find that the standing of 
congressional committees to bring actions was defeated where the resolution on 
which the committee relied did not sufficiently clearly authorize it to bring suit.100  
                                                                                                             
 
 94. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) 
(“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is 
not a reason to find standing.”). The Court rejected standing by citizens, or taxpayers, to 
challenge Members of Congress retaining their membership in the Armed Forces Reserve as 
a violation of Article I, section 6, which provides that “no Person holding any Office under 
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” It is 
also possible that the issue would be deemed a “political question” committed to each house 
to decide whether to expel a member. 
 95. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829; see also id. at 834 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
 96. Cf., e.g., Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 
1647–52 (1977) (distinguishing suits brought by individual Members of Congress for alleged 
institutional injuries from suits brought by the entire Congress). 
 97. In addition to Raines, discussed below, see Ariz. Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 
2667 (2013) (refusing to accept the conclusion of the state court concerning the authority of 
referendum proponents to defend the constitutionality of a law enacted by referendum, because 
those proponents were not state officials subject to the control of the state in the ordinary 
course); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“We have 
recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute 
unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.”) (citing 
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987)); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. at 82 (indicating that a 
state may designate the speaker of its legislature to defend the constitutionality of a law that 
the executive branch of the state will not defend).  
 98. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 829; see also id. at n.10. 
 99. Id. at 815–16. 
 100. See Reed v. Cty. Comm’rs of Del. Cty., 277 U.S. 376 (1928) (finding that the Senate 
resolutions relied upon were inadequate to authorize Senate committee members to resort to 
litigation to obtain certain records concerning a contested election). Although the Constitution 
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Relatedly, to the extent that the claim involves an alleged denial of the right of 
Members of Congress to vote, it may be relevant whether enough Members of 
Congress, from the appropriate chamber(s), have joined in the litigation to suggest 
that a vote might change the status quo,101 indicating that the dispute has the kind of 
immediacy of real consequences sometimes captured by prudential elements of 
justiciability law.102 As a logical matter, if the injury is to a right to vote, that injury 
is cured by the opportunity to vote regardless of the outcome; but in the more 
pragmatic approach sometimes taken by courts to issues of standing, courts may be 
more inclined to intervene in ongoing political disputes if judicial intervention may 
really make a difference in more than an abstract way. 
Finally, as Professor Fallon has recently said, “whether a plaintiff has suffered a 
judicially cognizable injury—and, if so, whether the relief sought is sufficiently 
likely to redress it to support standing—frequently turns on the provision of law 
under which a plaintiff seeks relief.”103 Here, I suggest that it will matter whether the 
claim itself is one that has a sufficient specificity that it can be distinguished from 
claims that would allow congressional standing with respect to any public dispute. 
As will be discussed below, Legislative Vesting Clause or Take Care Clause claims, 
or claims based on asserted violations of appropriations legislation, arguably lack—
except perhaps in very narrow circumstances—the specificity that would enable 
courts to confine legislative standing to narrow, discrete areas.  
Each of these factors is not necessarily relevant to every claim of legislator or 
legislative standing, and some of the factors may overlap. But together they can work 
to afford courts needed analytical tools in an area that is difficult because the 
                                                                                                             
 
gives each house of Congress the authority to make its own rules, where the rights of those 
outside a house are placed at stake in litigation, the interpretation of those rules—including 
what they authorize—becomes a matter for judicial determination. See United States v. Smith, 
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932). 
 101. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 823 (characterizing Coleman v. Miller as depending, 
inter alia, on the presence as party litigants of “legislators whose votes would have been 
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act”); Nash, supra note 90, at 376–77 
(suggesting that requiring formal authorization by a house is inconsistent with vindicating 
constitutional congressional interest under special supermajority constitutional voting rules); 
Note, supra note 30, at 1756–57 (criticizing Raines’ possible requirement of a house resolution 
authorizing litigation as applied, for example, to supermajority voting rules for adopting 
treaties). 
 102. One other issue is worth noting here: it is possible that, in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983), both houses of Congress would need to join in litigation, the purpose and 
effect of which was to change the legal status or obligations of persons outside the Congress. 
See Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power To Represent Itself in 
Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 603–14 (2014) (arguing that the presumption of bicameralism 
would preclude a single house from asserting a grievance with respect to failure to carry out, 
enforce, or defend an enacted law); Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing 
Jurisdiction at 15–17, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307) (arguing 
that a single house acting alone may lack authority to assert an injury belonging to Congress 
as a whole). 
 103. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1071 
(2015); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 232–47 
(1988).  
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distinctive status of being an elected member of the legislature might plausibly 
support very broad claims of standing. Bearing these factors in mind, how, then, 
should claims of standing in various areas be analyzed? I begin with what seem to 
be relatively easy cases.  
A. Standing to Contest Entitlement to an Office 
An individual legislator’s standing to contest entitlement to his or her office 
appears well settled. It was not even mentioned as a disputed issue in Powell v. 
McCormack (1969), where the Court found justiciable Adam Clayton Powell’s suit 
challenging the House of Representatives refusal to seat him.104 Had Powell lacked 
standing, it is inconceivable that the Court would not have discussed that issue, in a 
case where vigorous arguments about justiciability, revolving around the “political 
question” doctrine, were discussed at length. In principle, questions of a legislator’s 
entitlement to take his or her seat involves an individual right that also coincides with 
the democratic rights of those who, it is asserted, elected the legislator. And it is clear 
that the legislator denied his or her seat has a special and quite concrete injury that is 
not widely shared. Moreover, these claims involve an intrabranch contest within 
Congress, not involving the President; in hearing such disputes courts are thus taking 
on only one of the two political branches. Legislators’ standing to contest their 
exclusion from office thus stands on firm foundations of precedent, constitutional 
purposes, and concern for consequences.105 
B. Actions to Enforce Subpoenas 
The power of each house of Congress to conduct investigations, including 
issuance of subpoenas, has been established since at least the early part of the 
twentieth century as ancillary to Congress’s lawmaking functions.106 Although 
                                                                                                             
 
 104. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court found the question justiciable, rejecting the argument 
that it was nonjusticiable, for reasons primarily focused on the political question doctrine. See 
id. at 516–49. It concluded that Powell had been unconstitutionally excluded, because the only 
grounds on which a member could be excluded were failure to meet the standing qualifications 
provided by the Constitution—age, citizenship, and residency. See id. at 489, 550. 
 105. Other claims relating to the apportionment of seats, as in the conduct of the U.S. 
Census, might stand on similar ground, although the connection is somewhat more attenuated; 
the Supreme Court did not reach the question of congressional standing in its decision on 
census methodology, Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 
328–30 (1999), though the standing of the House was upheld in the three-judge court below. 
See U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 
1998) (upholding standing on informational injury grounds and on grounds that the current 
House had a concrete and strong interest in its own future composition and in preventing 
political manipulation). I do not address in this Essay other kinds of claims by some Members 
of Congress that internal rules or decisions have inequitably reduced their voting power. See, 
e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Like the issue in Powell, such claims involve intrabranch, rather than 
interbranch, conflict; in such conflicts, some political methods of redress (e.g., oversight 
hearings, funding bans), available in interbranch disputes, would be unavailable.   
 106. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); see also Anderson v. Dunn, 
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Congress has other means to enforce its subpoenas—including imprisoning 
subpoenaed witnesses who must then seek release through habeas corpus107— 
recognizing the standing of committees or houses of Congress to seek judicial 
assistance in enforcing subpoenas is supported by a fairly long historical pedigree, 
dating back at least to the 1920s, when the Senate adopted its 1928 Standing Order 
authorizing Senate committees to bring civil actions to, inter alia, enforce 
subpoenas.108  
                                                                                                             
 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225–29 (1821); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per 
curiam) (noting Congress’s investigatory powers).  
 107. See, e.g., Barry v. U.S. ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619–20 (1929); McGrain 
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 160, 174 (“[T]he power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is 
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”); see also TODD GARVEY & 
ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34114, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: A SKETCH (2014) [hereinafter GARVEY & 
DOLAN, A SKETCH]. According to Garvey and Dolan, three mechanisms exist for vindication 
of this subpoena power: “inherent contempt power,” as was used in the nineteenth century, 
under which the house that subpoenaed a witness could bring contempt charges against the 
witness, hold an abbreviated trial, and imprison for contempt until the subpoena was complied 
with; referral of the case to the U.S. Attorney for a criminal contempt prosecution that was, 
unlike civil contempt, not curable by compliance; or bringing a civil enforcement proceeding 
in a court to compel the witness to produce. Id. at 1. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 
181–90 (1881), suggested that punishment for contempt was a judicial function, beyond the 
power of Congress, but found it unnecessary to so hold, resting instead on the proposition that 
“no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his 
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire,” which 
jurisdiction was lacking, id. at 190. Kilbourn was interpreted in McGrain as resting on the lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the inquiry. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 170–
71. The McGrain Court upheld the authority of the Senate to require witnesses to attend 
legislative hearings and to hold the witness in contempt. See id. at 180 (finding the witness to 
have wrongfully refused to appear and to have been lawfully “attached,” and concluding that 
the district court “erred in discharging him from custody”). 
 108. See S. JOURNAL, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1928) (reflecting approval of S. RES. 262, 
70th Cong. (1928)); see also GARVEY & DOLAN, A SKETCH, supra note 107, at 11 n.78. Since 
1978, the Senate has had explicit statutory authority to bring civil enforcement actions in 
courts, of which several have been pursued. According to another research paper by Garvey 
and Dolan, on at least six occasions between 1979 and 1995 the Senate authorized litigation 
to enforce a subpoena. See TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 25 (2014) [hereinafter GARVEY & 
DOLAN, LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE]. 
  On the House side, there do not appear to be either standing orders or statutory 
authority, although the standing of the House or its committees to sue to enforce subpoenas, 
of both private entities and the Executive Branch, has been upheld in the lower courts. See 
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Comm. on the 
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64–65 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2013). A later 
decision in the Holder case is pending appeal. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. 
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The standing of legislative bodies to enforce congressional subpoenas through 
judicial action poses relatively small risks to the overall separation of powers 
scheme, although other justiciability (or  other constitutional) barriers to enforcing 
such subpoenas against executive branch officials may exist.109 Moreover, 
recognizing congressional standing here has the benefit of providing an independent 
judicial forum in which the persons who receive such subpoenas, even if they are 
government officials,  can advance and protect their own asserted rights not to testify 
or produce information.110 It is thus consistent with the role of the federal courts to 
protect individual rights from abusive government conduct. 
C. Claims Relating to Special Prerogatives to Vote in Congress 
 This next group of cases is more difficult. They involve contexts in which 
congressional actors might claim that their votes were “completely nullified,” 
drawing on the Supreme Court’s case law involving state legislatures,111 or that they 
have been denied any opportunity to vote on a matter on which their vote is required. 
With limited exceptions, discussed first below, they lack historic precedent for the 
justiciability of their claims; other relevant factors may vary across contexts. 
                                                                                                             
 
House of Representatives v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101 (2016); see GARVEY & DOLAN, LAW, 
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE, supra at 30, 35–37 (noting U.S. Department of Justice’s 
justiciability objections to efforts by Congress to enforce subpoenas against Executive Branch 
officers); cf. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53. The district court in Miers had denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss the action to compel the President’s White House Counsel to 
provide evidence, id. at 65–78 (rejecting argument that the House committee lacked standing), 
id. at 78–99 (rejecting other grounds for dismissal); it was, according to Irv Nathan, the first 
time the House had successfully sued the Executive Branch to enforce subpoenas of testimony 
that the White House was trying to protect. See Irvin B. Nathan, Opinion, A Dangerous 
Obamacare Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/appeal-house-v-burwell/2015/10/04/d8eec2d6-693f-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html? 
utm_term-.f9229965eb75 [https://perma.cc/F6YV-4Z6N].  
 109. See GARVEY & DOLAN, A SKETCH, supra note 107, at 13–15, 14 n.94.  
 110. On the possibility of Congress using its “long dormant inherent contempt power” or 
making a referral to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, or instead using civil 
enforcement actions, see GARVEY & DOLAN, LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE, 
supra note 108, at 1–2. On the importance of the courts’ role in protecting individual rights in 
resolving justiciability questions, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring). But cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1990) 
(rejecting the argument that it is more important for the Court to adjudicate claimed violations 
of individual rights provisions than of structural provisions, and finding justiciable a challenge 
to a statute claimed to have been enacted in violation of the Origination Clause). In Munoz-
Flores, however, it is important to note that it was an individual challenging the validity of a 
statute under which he was prosecuted, asserting his liberty interest in not being prosecuted 
under an invalid statute. See id. at 394. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33, 39–41 (discussing Coleman v. Miller and 
Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Districting Commission); see also infra notes 135, 186 
(discussing Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case law on legislator standing). 
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1. INS v. Chadha: Standing to Defend Statutes’ Constitutionality or to Give Effect 
to a Congressional Vote?  
Consider INS v. Chadha,112 involving the constitutionality of a statutory 
legislative veto provision at the federal level. Congress enacted legislation providing 
that the Attorney General could suspend deportation for certain otherwise deportable 
aliens, provided that the Attorney General notify Congress of such suspensions and 
further provided that either house of Congress could, by resolution of that house, 
countermand the Attorney General’s decision and return the alien to deportable 
status. The House of Representatives so voted for six individuals, including 
Chadha.113 On Chadha’s appeal from an INS decision implementing that vote, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the legislative veto unconstitutional.114 
The U.S. government agreed, but took an appeal; both houses of Congress had 
intervened and also filed notices of appeal.115  
The Supreme Court rejected justiciability challenges, concluding first “that the 
INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from 
taking action it would otherwise take” that the government was a proper party to take 
the appeal.116 It discussed the presence of the two houses of Congress to show that 
the controversy was presented in sufficiently adverse form. The Court ended this 
discussion by stating “[w]e have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend 
the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with 
enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or 
unconstitutional.”117 To the extent the Court meant to refer to a party proper, as 
opposed to an amicus curiae, this statement was incorrect. The Court cited two cases 
in support; one of the two cited cases was completely inapposite, and the other 
involved a house of Congress arguing as an amicus.118 
Although this dictum is cited in support of the proposition that Congress has 
standing to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the Justice Department 
declines to defend it,119 the circumstances of Chadha were far narrower than this 
dictum suggests. The substantive issue involved Congress’s defense of a statutory 
voting prerogative of one of its houses, acting alone, to prevent a deportation.120 If 
                                                                                                             
 
 112. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 113. Id. at 926–27. 
 114. See id. at 928. 
 115. See id. at 930 & n.5.  
 116. Id. at 930. 
 117. Id. at 940. 
 118. The Court cited only two cases in support. The first, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 
U.S. 206 (1968), has nothing to do with the issue. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946), Congress appeared as an amicus, defending the constitutionality of a statute that both 
the Executive and the plaintiffs agreed was unconstitutional. See id. at 304, 306. For 
discussion, see Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction, supra note 
102, at 8–15; Grove, supra note 21, at 1360–61. 
 119. See, e.g., Brief on Jurisdiction for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
of the U.S. House of Representatives at 16, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(No. 12-307).  
 120. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923–28. 
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the one-house “veto” cancelling the suspension of Chadha’s deportation was treated 
as invalid, the vote of the House would arguably be “completely nullified,” in accord 
with the Court’s case law on legislative standing of state legislatures.121 Indeed, as 
Justice Scalia noted in his Windsor dissent, in Chadha “the House and Senate were 
threatened with destruction of what they claimed to be one of their institutional 
powers.”122 
Some scholars and jurists have argued that Congress should have standing to 
defend the constitutionality of statutes not defended by the Executive Branch.123 
Although the Court’s dictum in Chadha could be read to support this proposition 
(and the Court has indicated its support for allowing state legislative leaders standing 
to defend the constitutionality of state laws when state law authorizes them to do 
so),124 Professor Tara Grove has argued that at the federal level the Take Care clause 
vests litigation authority to defend or not to defend the constitutionality of federal 
law only in the Executive Branch.125 Moreover, she points out the presence within 
                                                                                                             
 
 121. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652, 2665–66 (2015); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).  
 122. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 123. E.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent 
Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1247–50 (2012); Abner Greene, Interpretive 
Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But Not-Defend Problem, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582–98 (2012); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 914 (2012) (arguing more generally that Congress should participate as a party in more 
litigation, statutory and constitutional); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives 
had standing to defend the constitutionality of DOMA).  
 124. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987). In this case, involving the constitutionality 
of a moment of silence law, state law authorized the leaders of the state assembly and the upper 
house of the state legislature to represent the state in litigation. Id. at 81–82. In this context, 
the Court explained in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, “[w]e have recognized that 
state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if 
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.” 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). In 
Karcher, the appeal was dismissed because former heads were no longer in office, but the 
judgment below was not vacated because the state legislature could have but chose not to 
appeal. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 81–83. In Arizonans for Official English, the Court did not decide 
any issue of legislative standing, finding the case moot, though it expressed “grave doubts” 
that the organizers of the initiative to place the provisions of the challenged law on a 
referendum ballot had standing to defend the constitutionality of the enacted law. 520 U.S. at 
66.  
 125. See Grove, supra note 21, at 1312, 1353–61 (arguing that although the “Take Care” 
clause confers authority on the President to enforce and defend federal laws, Article I confers 
no such power on Congress and thus Congress and its subparts lack standing to do so); see 
also Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 624 (noting Supreme Court decisions holding that 
“[t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws”) (quoting 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)). For an argument that the Constitution does not 
create a cause of action for legislators to challenge the way laws are being implemented, see 
John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. & POL. 
103 (2015) (arguing that the Constitution creates an interest for legislators in the validity of 
enactments, not in how they are implemented, because the “legislative power” is a power to 
create, but not to execute, laws). 
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the executive branch and the absence within Congress of procedures to provide 
consistency on litigation positions, which may be of great importance to the 
individuals whose interests are at stake.126 Congressional participation as an amicus, 
she argues, is the method historically used, one that does not pose the threat of 
Congress’s litigation decisions affecting individual rights.127 As she and Neal Devins 
point out, allowing Congress or parts thereof to have intervenor status enables them 
to pick and choose what cases to appeal, a form of “prosecutorial discretion” at least 
arguably committed to the Executive Branch and posing genuine risks of 
inconsistency in the treatment of individuals.128  
These arguments against any broad approach to congressional standing to defend 
the constitutionality of statutes are supported by numerous Supreme Court decisions 
on the separation of powers, the thrust of which is that Congress cannot directly 
control the execution of the laws it enacts but is limited to efforts to influence the 
Executive Branch through oversight or to change the law through new substantive or 
appropriations statutes.129 Bringing a lawsuit or appealing from a judgment that the 
                                                                                                             
 
 126. Grove, supra note 21, at 1328. If the argument were accepted that Congress should 
have standing to defend the unconstitutionality of a law not being defended or enforced by the 
Executive, such a lawsuit might raise other Article III problems. Where the Executive is 
enforcing, but not defending, the statute, the Executive presumably would be bound by the 
judgment, and courts can secure an adequate defense of the statute’s constitutionality through 
amicus participation. Where the Executive is not enforcing the law, the legislature could not 
simply intervene in an ongoing lawsuit but would need to initiate one against the Executive. 
But actions to compel the government to enforce the law against third parties are difficult even 
for private parties to establish standing to bring. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 
(1973) (suggesting that the executive branch—even of state government—cannot be 
compelled to bring a prosecution against a third party). But cf., e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding jurisdiction to compel agency to act on the basis that it had 
made mistake of law in concluding it did not need to promulgate regulations). Moreover, 
having Congress or a house of Congress on one side of the litigation as a party litigant might 
present unusual challenges to the ability of a court to enforce its litigation-related orders or to 
grant relief on counterclaims. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (imposing 
limitations on lower courts’ power to sanction individual members of a city council for the 
city’s noncompliance with a consent decree); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing Members of 
Congress certain immunities from judicial process for their legislative activities). Similar 
problems would arise in actions such as those to enforce a subpoena, but as the range of issues 
broadens, so too do the range of remedial complications and counterclaims that might be raised 
by a defendant.  
 127. See Grove, supra note 21, at 1362. 
 128. Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 626–27.  
 129. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 269–70 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 732; INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 954 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126–27 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that 
Congress may engage in investigation but not in rulemaking or directly appointing persons to 
execute the laws, including to litigate about them). For a Court of Appeals decision rejecting 
the Senate’s standing, under a federal statute authorizing the Senate to intervene to defend the 
constitutionality of federal statutes, see Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 
2002) (distinguishing Chadha and other cases of congressional intervention as being “of a 
character that directly (particularly) implicated the authority of Congress within our scheme 
of government, and the scope and reach of its ability to allocate power among the three 
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Executive Branch has decided not to appeal would seem to be matters directly 
involving the execution of the laws and, however desirable such interventions might 
be in litigation among the branches of the state governments, would run up against a 
relatively thick set of judicial precedents insisting on a separation of those functions 
at the national level.130  
Chadha could be understood more narrowly to involve standing to assert a 
specific legislative prerogative to vote under a federal statute. The presence of such 
a specific, concrete interest would provide a usable limiting principle to distinguish 
Chadha from other cases, where congressional actors may seek to intervene to defend 
the constitutionality of a federal statute, as in Windsor.131 And Coleman v. Miller,132 
a case coming out of the state courts, and its progeny would support a narrow 
“complete nullification” basis for congressional standing, although—as the Court 
recently noted in the Arizona Legislature case—separation of powers concerns exist 
with Congress invoking federal courts jurisdiction to challenge executive action that 
do not arise when state legislatures sue state officials.133 
Even under such a limiting “complete nullification” principle, there are several 
classes of cases plausibly involving allegations that congressional actors were 
deprived of a right to vote or that a vote already taken by or in Congress has been 
“completely nullified,”134 including issues about pocket vetoes, treaties, wars, 
confirmations, and foreign emoluments.135 Each has distinctive histories, purposes, 
and contexts, as discussed further below.  
                                                                                                             
 
branches”). Other aspects of the case, including the standing of the father who challenged the 
constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance’s reference to God, and the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief directed against either the President or the Congress, were 
addressed in other opinions. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), 
amended on reh’g by 328 F.3d 466, 484–90 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (finding that the father-plaintiff lacked prudential 
standing).  
 130. But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a House committee had standing to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a 
federal statute being enforced but not defended by the Executive Branch). Justice Scalia, 
joined by two others, disagreed. See id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority did 
not reach the question.  
 131. See above note * (describing the author’s prior involvement as Court-appointed amica 
curiae in Windsor). 
 132. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
 133. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2664–66, 2265 n.12 (2015). 
 134. See id. at 2665–66; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).  
 135. Private persons have been allowed to raise Origination Clause claims—that is, claims 
that a statute adversely affecting them was a revenue for raising taxes that should have, but 
did not, originate in the House. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). In a 
pre-Raines v. Byrd decision, the D.C. Circuit held that nineteen members of the House had 
standing to raise an Origination Clause claim against the constitutionality of a tax law. See 
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that 
plaintiffs “allege[d] a specific injury in fact to a cognizable legal interest: the deprivation of 
an opportunity to debate and vote on the origination of TEFRA in the House” before it was 
considered in the Senate, observing that “[d]eprivation of a constitutionally mandated process 
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2. On Pocket Vetoes 
 In Kennedy v. Sampson,136 the D.C. Circuit in 1974 upheld the standing of 
Senator Kennedy, filing on his own and without authorization from the Senate, to 
challenge the President’s claim that he had vetoed a bill enacted by Congress; in 
Senator Kennedy’s view, the purported pocket veto was ineffective. Whether the 
President can “pocket veto” a bill depends on whether Congress was in session to 
receive the veto message; only if it is not does the President’s failure to sign a bill 
within ten days of its being presented to him effectively veto the law. In this case, 
the President took the position that he had successfully pocket vetoed a law; Senator 
Kennedy argued that Congress had arranged to receive veto messages and that the 
bill had accordingly become law without the President’s signature on the tenth day 
after presentation.137 The D.C. Circuit at the time concluded that the Senator had 
standing because his allegations, if correct on the merits, nullified his vote in support 
of the bill and injured him as a legislator.138  
After Raines v. Byrd cast some doubt on theories of individual legislator standing, 
the D.C. Circuit in Chenoweth v. Clinton139 suggested that legislative standing in a 
case like Kennedy v. Sampson to challenge whether a law had been vetoed might still 
be sustained on a complete nullification theory: “Because it was the President’s 
veto—not a lack of legislative support—that prevented the bill from becoming law . 
. . those in the majority could plausibly describe the President’s action as a complete 
nullification of their votes.”140 Uncertainty exists, however, in light of Raines’s 
suggestion that in cases of institutional injury, an action might need to be authorized 
by and on behalf of an entire house,141 and perhaps especially if the challenge is one 
that might also be brought by a private person who could try to claim injury from 
                                                                                                             
 
of enacting law may inflict a more specific injury on a member of Congress than would be 
presented by a generalized complaint that a legislator's effectiveness is diminished by 
allegedly illegal activities taking place outside the legislative forum”). Nonetheless the Moore 
court refused to adjudicate the complaint on separation-of-powers informed equitable grounds 
because the plaintiffs could obtain relief by persuading other Members of Congress to their 
views and because private persons would have standing to challenge. Id. at 954–56. 
Chenoweth, decided after Raines, implies that Moore’s reasoning on standing was too broad. 
See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 136. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In The Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis (or San Poil), 
Nespelem, Colville & Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of the State of Washington v. United States 
(The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S. 655 (1929), although Congress and the President took a 
different view of whether the President had successfully “pocket vetoed” the law in question, 
neither part of Congress appeared as a party; “Representative Hatton Sumners appeared as 
amicus curiae only on behalf of the House Judiciary Committee.” Grove & Devins, supra note 
102, at 588. 
 137. See Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432. 
 138. See id., at 433–35 (rejecting argument that only the Congress as a whole, or one of its 
houses, had standing, because the Senator’s interest, while “derivative” of his membership in 
the body, is nonetheless substantial). 
 139. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 140. Id. at 117. 
 141. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
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nonenforcement of the law.142 However, unlike the issue in Raines v. Byrd, where 
the question of harm to legislator authority was contingent, and unlike issues that can 
be raised under the Take Care, Legislative Vesting, or Appropriations Clauses 
(discussed below), challenges to an executive claim of having vetoed a law, or of a 
law not having obtained sufficient votes to be inscribed as a public law of the United 
States, are far more discrete and confined. Standing in cases like Senator Kennedy’s 
challenge thus remains possible, but uncertain; were a house of Congress to authorize 
litigation in such a context—where the President and Congress disagree over the 
effect of a congressional vote in favor of a proposed law—the case for legislative 
standing would be stronger. With respect to concerns raised earlier about expansive 
approaches to congressional standings, such situations will be rare, not common. And 
where there is uncertainty over whether something is enacted law, rule of law 
considerations might favor—rather than disfavor—rapid resolution of the 
controversy, a factor that might support legislative standing.  
3. Treaties  
In Goldwater v. Carter,143 eight Senators challenged the President’s authority 
unilaterally to terminate a treaty without some form of congressional consent. The 
Supreme Court did not resolve whether the Senators had standing to raise the claim: 
four members thought the issue was a nonjusticiable political question, and a fifth 
believed that the controversy was not yet ripe because the Senate had not taken a 
final position in opposition to the President.144 The claim of injury was 
conceptualized as a procedural right to vote before the action is taken, and if the 
substantive claim were correct then arguably there was such a procedural injury.145 
                                                                                                             
 
 142. Cf. id. (noting that the decision does not foreclose a “constitutional challenge (by 
someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act)”). Some nonenf-
orcement claims are more difficult to establish standing for. See infra note 207.  
 143. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The case was brought by eight Senators, along with sixteen 
Members of the House and a former Senator. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 
(D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996.  
 144. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that the complaint should be dismissed as not ripe for judicial review); id. at 1002 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment and joined by three other Justices) (arguing that the 
case is nonjusticiable because it presents a political question).  
 145. A procedural claim of a right to vote might, in theory, be accepted as a form of 
concrete injury—caused by a failure to vote and redressable by an opportunity to vote, 
regardless of outcome. But the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, interpreting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Raines v. Byrd, suggests that standing would be lacking on such a procedural theory 
without some reason to believe that either the Senate as a whole, or at least enough individual 
senators to prevent the unmaking of the treaty, were joined or represented as plaintiffs. See 
supra text accompanying note 33; see also infra note 186. (It is uncertain whether, in 
Goldwater, if (for example) a two-thirds Senate vote were required to terminate a treaty, thirty-
four Senators would have had standing (or if a majority vote were required and one assumes 
a filibuster rule, whatever minority was required to overcome a filibuster would have had 
standing).) In an arguably analogous case involving the claim that Congress had the right to 
condition the President’s termination of an employee on Senate consent, Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), a Member of the Senate was appointed only “as a friend of the 
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But under Raines v. Byrd the Court might well insist on something more than 
individual members acting separately—perhaps on a group large enough to be likely 
to be able to block approval (if approval were substantively required). Only if the 
group were large enough to block (which the group of eight Senator plaintiffs was 
not), but not large enough to enact prohibitory legislation, might there be a situation 
with no other form of redress available,146 especially if the treaty did not confer the 
kind of individual benefits that would give rise to standing by those outside the 
government. Although these factors would support standing for the Senate itself (or 
conceivably for a large enough group of Senators who could defeat a vote), a claim 
of injury because no vote at all was held might be viewed as a step removed from the 
kind of nullification involved in Coleman v. Miller, Chadha, or the lower court 
pocket veto cases—though not unlike the claim in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Districting Commission.  
Another kind of claim, unsuccessfully advanced recently by Senator Ron Paul in 
Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury,147 is that an intergovernmental agreement 
was really a treaty, requiring the concurrence of the Senate. Crawford was an action 
to enjoin enforcement of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which requires 
various measures to get more information about foreign banking by U.S. citizens to 
the IRS.148 Senator Paul’s claim for standing was rejected by the district court, which 
reasoned that under Raines v. Byrd, the asserted institutional injury to the Senate’s 
institutional interests was not sufficient for standing, at least where Senator Paul was 
litigating without authorization from the Senate as a body.149   
Given the availability of other ways to challenge action based on executive 
agreements claimed to have needed Senate approval before they could function as 
law, the possibility of private party standing, and the sheer number of executive 
agreements that are reached, individual legislator standing should generally be 
rejected. Even if the Senate were to authorize litigation, the risks of erroneous, 
intrusive, or ill-timed judicial decisions seem much higher in this area in which much 
will depend on executive practice in reaching agreements with foreign nations.150  
Finally, permitting legislative standing on these issues will not necessarily involve 
only a relatively rare and discrete question about the legal significance of an 
                                                                                                             
 
Court,” id. at 176, to argue in support of the constitutionality of a federal statute that the 
Executive Branch argued was unconstitutional. But the Senate did not participate as a party, 
nor was such participation necessary for the Court to decide the issue in the case brought by 
Myers, who clearly suffered an Article III injury. 
 146. See supra note 101; cf. supra note 135 (describing Moore’s refusal to adjudicate).  
 147. No. 3:15-cv-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at *6.  
 150. It has been suggested that the interests of foreign nations in knowing the legal status 
of their agreements with the United States, and the uncertainties that may surround the 
domestic legality of particular executive agreements, might support expanded congressional 
standing. Given the President’s authority to seek legal opinions from his cabinet, as well as 
the possibility of nongovernmental entities having standing, those interests would not 
ordinarily provide a sufficient reason to jettison the cautionary approach urged in this Essay.  
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acknowledged congressional vote;  there were reportedly 5491 executive agreements 
executed from 1990 to 2012 alone.151 
4. Confirmations and Recess Appointments 
 Professor Jamal Greene has recently suggested that standing requirements should 
be relaxed to allow Congress or its houses to bring actions to challenge Executive 
Branch positions, like those at issue in NLRB v. Noel Canning,152 involving clear 
constitutional rules whose application would later be justiciable in some form.153 
Professor Greene argues that it is costly to allow uncertainty over the validity of an 
appointment to linger until raised by a private party and adjudicated, with ensuing 
disruption as other judgments of the same body might be at issue.154 A claim by 
Senators that the President acted in violation of the recess appointment provisions 
might be framed as one involving injury to the Senate’s right to vote on 
appointments.  
Justiciability doctrines, to be sure, can cause delay in resolving a constitutional 
issue, requiring courts to wait until an individual is adversely affected. Such delay is 
sometimes thought to have the benefit of allowing distance from the passions of the 
moment (partisan or otherwise), as well as an accumulation of experience before the 
finality of constitutional adjudication. Indeed, the Court in Raines v. Byrd said, given 
“time-honored concern[s] about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper 
constitutional sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the 
merits of this important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and 
efficiency.”155 On the other hand, delay in responding to obvious unconstitutionality 
wreaks its own form of stress on constitutional democracies.  
In Myers v. United States,156 the issue was the constitutionality of a statutory 
provision requiring the Senate’s consent to removal of an executive branch officer. 
The officer was removed, and challenged the President’s act of removal as 
inconsistent with the statute, thereby raising the constitutional issue. A member of 
the Senate was heard “as a friend of the Court,”157 but did not participate as a party.  
In United States v. Smith,158 some eight years later, the Attorney General 
authorized the bringing of an action in the name of the United States at the behest of 
the Senate, to raise an asserted power of the Senate to withdraw confirmation of an 
executive branch officer who had already received his commission. The Senate had 
initially confirmed the nominee and then, on receipt of additional information, had 
                                                                                                             
 
 151. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1210 (2018) (Table 1); see also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. 
LAW 3 (2010) (indicating some 16,500 executive agreements were concluded by the United 
States between 1939 and 2009). 
 152. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 153. Greene, supra note 73, at 142–52. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
 156. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 157. Id. at 176. 
 158. 286 U.S. 6, 29–30 (1932). 
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voted to withdraw the confirmation.159 The Senate’s argument that it had power to 
do so was rejected. Whether this should be regarded as an instance of congressional 
standing is uncertain, as the action was brought in the name of the United States and 
only with the permission of the Attorney General.160 And in any event, it involved a 
completed vote, the effect of which was arguably “completely nullified” by the 
President’s refusal to withdraw the nomination or terminate the officer, who had 
already received his commission, emphasizing what a narrow proposition the case 
stands for if it is read as a congressional standing case.  
Precedent, thus, suggests that claims about whether officers have been duly 
appointed or removed come within the Article III courts’ jurisdiction when they are 
raised by the affected individual, as in Myers; when the authority of the officer is 
challenged by persons adversely affected by the officer’s action, as in Noel Canning;  
or possibly when both the executive and legislative branches agree to submit the 
issue through something in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding to test the 
legality of an office holder’s appointment, as in Smith. 
Another kind of case would involve a claim that a seemingly duly appointed 
officeholder was nonetheless barred from office for some constitutional or statutory 
reason. In Ex parte Levitt,161 a citizen and member of the Supreme Court bar 
challenged the validity of former Senator Hugo Black’s Supreme Court appointment, 
on the grounds, inter alia, that he had been in the Senate when retirement benefits for 
federal judges were increased and was thus barred by Article I, Section 6.162 The 
Court denied standing, on the grounds that the plaintiff had shown no direct injury 
specific to him and that a generalized grievance held in common with all citizens was 
insufficient.  
Private litigants may have standing to challenge the validity of the appointment 
of a judge hearing their case, as in  Noel Canning.163 (If the office is one for which 
such private claim of injury could not or would not likely arise, then the case for 
senatorial standing would be stronger, and would be strengthened if the Senate as a 
whole adopted a resolution authorizing such litigation.) Claims about recess 
appointments, in particular, might be regarded as so limited a potential group as not 
                                                                                                             
 
 159. Id. at 28–30.  
 160. See id. at 26 (describing the case as a “petition, in the name of the United States, for 
a writ of quo warranto . . . filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on relation 
of the district attorney, in deference to the desire of the United States Senate to have presented 
for judicial decision the question whether George Otis Smith holds lawfully the office of 
member and chairman of the Federal Power Commission”). 
 161. 302 U.S 633 (1937) (per curiam). Levitt is described in Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1973):  
The petition asserted that the appointment and confirmation of the Justice in 
August 1937 was unlawful because the Act of March 1, 1937, permitting Justices 
to retire at full salary after a period of specified service, thereby increased the 
emoluments of the office and that the statute was enacted while the challenged 
Justice was a Senator. 
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time 
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United 
States . . .  the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”).  
 163. See also, e.g., Ryder v United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 
U.S. 868 (1991). 
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to pose major risks to either the role of the courts or intergovernmental relations 
between the political branches if standing were expanded. On the other hand, such 
claims—like those that an executive agreement was really a treaty requiring Senate 
confirmation—involve congressional voting that has not yet occurred, arguably 
representing a somewhat weaker claim of institutional injury and in many instances, 
presenting an issue that a privately injured litigant could raise. 
5. War 
As to war powers, repeated efforts to invoke Article III jurisdiction to enjoin 
hostilities have failed, on various justiciability related grounds.164 As courts have 
said, Congress has other remedies—including enacting laws concerning 
appropriations for war or specific prohibitions on having troops in particular places; 
the exercise of judicial power, some courts have concluded, is unnecessary.165 Yet as 
other constitutional courts have recognized, the political realities are that once troops 
are in hostilities, it is virtually impossible for a democratic legislature not to support 
them; once troops are committed, the moment for exercising any constitutional 
requirement for legislative approval in advance has in some sense been mooted by 
facts on the ground. For this reason, the German Constitutional Court has required 
advance legislative approval of decisions to commit troops outside of Germany in 
circumstances in which hostilities are likely.166 
Given the close relationship between issues of war making and potential injury to 
an individual’s right not to be deprived of life without due process of law, as applied 
to individual soldiers, there might be reasons sounding in commitment to individual 
rights to entertain such suits when brought by military personnel challenging their 
deployment as inconsistent with constitutional requirements for authorization of such 
action.167  On the other hand, there may be other barriers of justiciability or prudence 
                                                                                                             
 
 164. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 135 (1st Cir. 2003) (ripeness); Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (standing); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 
(4th Cir. 1975) (political question); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (political 
question); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (standing and political 
question); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (ripeness). 
 165. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2011); Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); cf. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(noting that Congress might still take some action in response to later developments in 
analyzing why claim was not ripe). 
 166. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 841–53 (excerpting the AWACS II case, 
Judgment of the Second Senate, 7 May 2008, 2 BvE 1/03). But it operates in a system that 
specifically authorizes minority groups in the legislature to bring such claims to the 
constitutional court. 
 167. As noted in text below, courts may have other reasons to find—especially once troops 
are engaged—that adjudicating the issue of prior consent, or granting a remedy with 
immediate effect, is a “political question” beyond judicial competence, in part because a court 
simply may not feel it has the space to hold an ongoing action involving hostilities outside the 
United States to be unconstitutional. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting as a 
factor in treating issue as a nonjusticiable “political question” whether there was an “unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). 
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to such individual soldier actions: permitting suits by individual members of the 
Armed Services against their Commander-in-Chief might be thought incompatible 
with the Commander-in-Chief powers or to have too high a risk of involving courts 
in areas outside their expertise or to have too great a risk of multiple and conflicting 
judgments. And the relatively higher profile issues of a full-scale “war” may be such 
as to render political remedies—including elections, if not legislative restraint 
through the appropriation power—a more plausible “check” on Executive Branch 
action inconsistent with Congress’s power to declare war than exists with the number 
of the other issues discussed in this Part III.C. Even if individual soldier actions are 
barred from suit, it would not necessarily follow that individual Members of 
Congress should have standing; a stronger case for standing would exist if one house 
itself authorizes the specific challenge, given the magnitude of the question and the 
need—if the constitutional challenge were sustained—for both houses to “declare 
War.”   
6. Foreign Emoluments 
 Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution provides, in part, that “no Person 
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, without the 
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any 
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” This infrequently 
considered provision was designed to respond to the then-common practice by 
European monarchs of showering favored emissaries with expensive gifts, a practice 
that could create awkward situations for those wishing neither to offend a foreign 
sovereign nor appear (or become) corrupted.168 A famous example was when French 
King Louis XVI provided Benjamin Franklin a jewel-laden snuff box; Franklin 
reported it to the Continental Congress, which gave him permission to keep the 
gift.169 The Foreign Emoluments Clause provides a prophylactic form of protection, 
going beyond the common law bans on bribery.170  
                                                                                                             
 
That some challenges might be deemed nonjusticiable political questions does not necessarily 
mean that all such challenges—for example, ones brought prior to significant troop 
movements—would do so.  
 168. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 1–3, 24 (2014). 
 169. Id. at 25–26. 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 28 (emphasizing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause by its terms 
excludes gifts “of any kind whatever” and “forbids presents—not bribes”); see also LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 18–19 
(2011); NORMAN L. EISEN, RICHARD PAINTER & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE EMOLUMENTS 
CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 6–7 (2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-
clause1.pdf [https://perma.cc/82GC-SPCW]. The most recent opinion of the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel on the issue treats the Foreign Emoluments Clause as 
applicable to the President. See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts 
and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. (Dec. 
7, 2009), 2009 WL 6365082, at *4; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(1)(E) (2012) (applying to 
President and Vice President prohibition on accepting foreign gifts except under circumstances 
specified in the statute); Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 30, 40–48 (2012) (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause extends to elected 
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The provision is not an absolute bar but makes the constitutionality of accepting 
such gifts depend entirely on Congress’s approval. It is a default rule, anticipatory in 
character,171 not dependent on a corrupt intent by either the giver or accepter.172   
Acceptance of an unauthorized emolument creates a public harm that as to private 
parties is likely to be generalized rather than concrete.173 Under U.S. case law an 
interest in seeing that the law, statutory or constitutional, is complied with is, by 
itself, insufficient to afford standing.174 Indeed, in United States v. Richardson,175 the 
Court rejected taxpayer standing to challenge an asserted failure to comply with the 
Constitution’s command, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that “a regular Statement 
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published 
from time to time,” arising from the secrecy of some details of the CIA’s budget; it 
even suggested that if there was no foreseeable private litigant with concrete injury, 
this would suggest that the issue was a nonjusticiable political question.176  
                                                                                                             
 
office). Contra Seth Barrett Tillman,  The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
180, 185–95 (2012). For discussion of their disagreement, see Amandeep S. Grewal, The 
Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639, 645–49 (2017). 
 171. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 7.  
 172. See supra note 170; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (providing terms on which Congress consents 
to acceptance of gifts from foreign governments by federal officers or employees including 
the President and not including any explicit mens rea requirement). 
 173. A private group of restaurant owners joined one of the pending lawsuits against 
President Trump based on the Emoluments Clause, arguing competitive injury to their 
restaurants arising from the desire of foreign governments and businesses to curry favor with 
the Trump Administration by using his competing hotels and other services. The district court 
granted the government’s motion to dismiss their claim (along with that of a public interest 
organization) for lack of standing. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 
No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD), 2017 WL 6524851 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017). The district court found 
a failure adequately to allege that any receipt of emoluments caused any competitive injury or 
that any such injury would be redressable, due to the intervening effects of numerous third 
party acts, id. at 13–14, and because competitive injuries do not fall within the zone of interest 
of the Emoluments Clause, id. at 15–17. The zone of interests arguments, if accepted by other 
courts, would pose a considerable barrier to standing for other private parties.  
 174. For pending efforts to assert Emoluments Clause claims by nonfederal government 
entities, see Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-GBD 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017); District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. 
June 12, 2017). The federal district court recently held that the private party plaintiffs lacked 
standing. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 2017 WL 6524851. 
 175. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
 176. Id. at 179 (“In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to 
litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”). In another case, rejecting 
taxpayer and citizen standing to challenge the Reserve Officer membership of Members of 
Congress as a violation of the incompatibility clause of Article I, Section 6, clause 2, the Court 
expounded at length on the idea that standing cannot be predicated on undifferentiated injuries 
to all members of the public:  
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here 
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily 
abstract nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or 
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However, with respect to Members of Congress, there could be an additional 
injury if an officer of the United States has accepted an emolument without its 
consent—an injury to their prerogative to vote on whether it is permissible for an 
officer to accept the particular emolument.177 That is, Members of Congress could 
assert a violation, or “nullification,” of their constitutional authority to decide 
whether to consent to the acceptance of foreign emoluments.178 Unlike the claims of 
legislators in Raines v. Byrd, who had the opportunity to vote on the legislation they 
challenged, but lost, and whose claims of future injury were conjectural and subject 
to multiple political remedies, Emoluments Clause claims may allege that no vote 
was taken, no consent given, to the receipt of a specific foreign emolument. 
That the Emoluments Clause requires consent to legalize receipt of a gift, 
moreover, may mean that there are fewer political mechanisms available to Members 
of Congress to resolve dispute over the matter. The clause does not involve 
substantive legislation or appropriations, and thus new legislation may not provide a 
solution; viewing new legislation as a remedy is, moreover, arguably, inconsistent 
with where the Constitution places the burden of inertia. As to impeachment, a 
prominent speaker in the Virginia Ratifying Convention referred to its violation as 
                                                                                                             
 
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast 
it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential 
dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party 
have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. 
This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant 
authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse 
consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance. 
Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a 
court must rely on the parties’ treatment of the facts and claims before it to 
develop its rules of law.  
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to End the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1973). 
 177. For a currently pending case based on legislator standing, see Blumenthal v. Trump, 
No. 1-17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017). 
 178. For arguments in favor of legislative standing to raise the Emoluments Clause issue, 
see Matthew Hall, Who Has Standing To Sue the President over Allegedly Unconsstitutional 
Emoluments?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 767–74 (2017); Brianne J. Gorod, Congressional 
Standing Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, TAKE CARE (June 19, 2017), https:// 
takecareblog.com/blog/congressional-standing-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition [https:// 
perma.cc/CDA3-KSK6]; G. Michael Parsons, Raines Check: Legislator Standing and the 
Separation of Powers, TAKE CARE (July 10, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/raines-
check-legislator-standing-and-the-separation-of-powers [https://perma.cc/PN6Y-MCPC]; 
Richard Primus, Two Thoughts on the Government’s Motion to Dismiss in the CREW 
Emoluments Case, BALKINAZATION (June 9, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/two-
thoughts-on-governments-motion-to.html [https://perma.cc/56NU-RFHC]; Eric Segall, 
Members of Congress Have Standing in the Emoluments Suit, TAKE CARE (June 24, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/members-of-congress-have-standing-in-the-emoluments-suit 
[https://perma.cc/M3GU-VNHP]. For differing views, see Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty, 
Congressional Democrats To File Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congressional-democrats-to-file-emoluments-
lawsuit-against-trump/2017/06/13/270e60e6-506d-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DKV9-XNEF] (quoting Professor Grewal as suggesting that individual 
legislators would lack standing but that Congress as a body could sue). 
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amounting to an impeachable offense.179 But the prophylactic character of the 
Clause, as well as the civil character of the statute Congress enacted regulating 
foreign gifts,180 might be argued to exclude its violation from offenses warranting 
impeachment.181 Even if the Impeachment Clause is construed to authorize 
impeachment and removal for actions that are not technically crimes,182 including 
                                                                                                             
 
 179. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 9 (noting that Edmund Jennings Randolph spoke 
of the possibility of the President being removed from office by impeachment for violation of 
this provision at the Virginia Ratifying Convention); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE 58–59 (2017) (to similar effect); STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13–15 
(Comm. Print 1974) (to similar effect); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 90, at 2236 & n.178 
(suggesting that impeachment could be a remedy for violation of conflict of interest 
provisions, including the Foreign Emoluments Clause). 
 180. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342(h) (2012) (providing civil penalties for violation of the statute’s 
prohibition on receipt of foreign gifts). 
 181. See, e.g., IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 81–82 (1972) 
(concluding that “[t]he Constitution did not make honest error impeachable”); PETER CHARLES 
HOFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805, at 118 (1984) (arguing that a 
“corrupt motive” is needed). But whether a wrongful motive is required, whether the conduct 
must violate a criminal statute, and whether, at least with respect to the President, it must 
involve an abuse of public office that is great or repeated, are hotly contested. See, e.g., STAFF 
OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13–15, 21, 23–25, 27 (concluding that at the time of the 
Founding, the phrase “other high crimes and misdemeanors” was understood to “reach[] 
offenses against the government, and especially abuses of constitutional duties,” and was not 
limited to formal criminal conduct); ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-186, 
IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 
26, 30 (2010); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 89–91 
(1973); ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES 13, 321–22 (1992); 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 36, 48 (arguing that the phrase in English law referred to serious 
offenses even if not technically crimes and that it was intended to apply to “abuses of official 
power”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
603, 617 (1999) (referring to the three articles of impeachment voted by the House Committee 
against President Nixon to suggest that impeachable offenses need not be crimes but do need 
to have a connection to the official’s office and constitute an injury to the constitutional order).  
My sense is that the better view is that impeachable offenses are not limited to violation of 
criminal statutes but embrace conduct that is an abuse of office. In addition to sources cited, 
see 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 764 
(1851) (impeachment was not limited to specific criminal offenses but “has a more enlarged 
operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, political offenses, growing out of personal 
misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the 
discharge of the duties of political office”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (stating that “[t]he subjects of [a well-constituted impeachment court] are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse 
or violation of some public trust. . . . [and] are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety 
be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 182. Two of the three articles of impeachment voted by the House of Representatives 
Judiciary Committee against President Richard Nixon asserted misconduct that did not clearly 
charge a crime, but one of them clearly sounded in a wrongful abuse of office. The first count 
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presidential breaches of the Emoluments Clause, impeachment is a legally uncertain 
remedy for such a breach. 
Even if an alleged violation of the Emoluments Clause arising from receipt of a 
gift without consent were understood to create a concrete, “complete nullification” 
type of injury, it is doubtful that standing should be recognized for a single member 
of Congress.183 Unlike the situation in Kennedy v. Sampson, where a bill was voted 
upon and Senator Kennedy was among those voting in favor, where no vote at all 
has occurred the concreteness and particularity of any given member’s claim is 
somewhat attenuated. The Court’s hesitation to fully embrace procedural theories of 
standing—or the degree to which its willingness to accept such procedural theories 
depends highly on context—suggests that in fraught separation of powers contexts, 
it would be particularly hesitant to entertain a suit absent concrete reason to believe 
the judicial intervention would matter. However, if a house of Congress were itself 
to bring the claim, or conceivably if the plaintiff group included enough members to 
block or create real doubt that an affirmative vote in one house could occur, such 
factors might help support standing.  
This standing issue is difficult. Some of the factors I have identified as relevant—
the availability of private persons who could claim specific injury; or the presence of 
obvious political remedies given by the Constitution to the Congress—are at best 
uncertain, and alleged violations of this constitutional rule may be of real importance: 
Maintaining an Executive Branch free of potentially corrupting foreign government 
influences might be a predicate for both traditional judicial deference to presidential 
findings and a range of implied executive prerogatives the Court has found the 
Constitution to provide.184 Identifying a “foreign gift,” while not free from 
                                                                                                             
 
alleged an obstruction of justice, a crime; the second count alleged a failure to take care that 
the laws were faithfully executed and taking action in violation of the constitutional rights of 
citizens, a clear abuse of office; and the third count alleged a willful failure to produce 
documents in response to a subpoena. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
 183. Recall, as indicated at the outset, that it would not be logically inconceivable to treat 
a single member of the legislature as having a specific injury caused by the alleged denial of 
a right to vote on the issue; and if this were sufficient to state a claim of injury, it would be 
remediable by holding a vote. But as stated there, the traditional elements of standing for 
private parties are less helpful in distinguishing among different claims for standing for 
Members of Congress. In Kennedy v. Sampson, a single Senator’s standing to challenge a 
pocket veto was upheld; but, as noted above, Senator Kennedy was part of the majority that 
had already voted a bill out of Congress, providing a specificity to his claim that the Congress’s 
vote had been completely nullified. In other pre-Raines cases the D.C Circuit had upheld 
standing for a small number of Members of Congress, but in Moore v. U.S. House of 
Representatives, for example, the Origination Clause challenge to enacted legislation was held 
nonjusticable on equitable separation of powers grounds because relief could be sought from 
other Members of Congress, see supra note 135, and in Goldwater v. Carter, the Court of 
Appeals had adjudicated on the merits a claim that a treaty could not be unilaterally terminated 
by the President, but the Supreme Court found the claim nonjusticiable. See Goldwater v. 
Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).   
 184. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (noting 
the Court’s “customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs”); 
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ambiguity, is both less difficult and the need to do so would likely be more rare than, 
for example, distinguishing executive agreements from treaties;185 the relative rarity 
of the issue arising would mean that if standing were accepted here it would not 
necessarily imply a significant broadening of the courts’ jurisdiction over potential 
interbranch controversies. The specificity of the issue and the critical role of 
congressional consent in fulfilling the Constitution’s mandate, together with the 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of political remedies, taken together might 
support congressional standing by a large enough plaintiff group.186 Although these 
are factors that might favor congressional standing, Congress would have other 
                                                                                                             
 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (noting the “respect owed the President as 
Commander in Chief”); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (finding implied absolute 
immunity from civil damages for actions by the President in office); United States v. Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324 (1937) (inferring from the President’s power to receive Ambassadors the 
exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and incidental powers related thereto); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (inferring substantial presidential 
discretion in foreign affairs). 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 147–151. 
 186. It is unclear whether the challenging group would need to be both houses or one house 
of Congress, or a group whose votes “would have been sufficient to defeat” consent, Raines 
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997), or whether even a smaller group of congressional members 
might be found to have standing—the latter on the theory that part of the Emoluments Clause’s 
anti-corruption mechanism was to require Members of Congress to vote, thereby making 
individual Members accountable. It is also unclear whether an effort to obtain consent would 
need to have been made and failed in the Congress, before a court would consider the issue 
concretely enough exhausted in the political branches to make it prudent to adjudicate or ripe 
for adjudication. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 996–97 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding 
the treaty termination issue not yet ripe); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding war powers issue not yet ripe); see also 
Harrison, supra note 125, at 129 (arguing that “Raines implies that a particular vote is 
ineffective, completely nullified, and deprived of all validity, when a bill that had enough votes 
to pass and ‘would have become law’ is ‘deemed defeated’ and ‘does not go into effect,’ or 
when a bill with enough votes to be defeated ‘goes into effect’”). The number of legislators 
bringing an action might also bear on the D.C. Circuit’s older “circumscribed equitable 
discretion” doctrine, where, if the challenging Member of Congress could obtain relief through 
action of his or her fellow legislators, courts would decline to hear the case regardless of 
whether the requirements for standing are met. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 114 
(D.C. Cir 1999) (explaining that this doctrine had been previously invoked to dismiss a claim 
where a Member of Congress could “obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators,” 
Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (1981), but suggesting that, post-Raines, 
this factor goes to standing itself). Later case law seems to treat the possible availability of a 
legislative remedy as bearing on the presence of cognizable injury through “complete 
nullification” of the legislator’s voting power. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (treating the possibility that congressional plaintiffs could obtain a legislative 
remedy, including prohibitory legislation, appropriation cut off, or even impeachment, as 
going to whether there was the kind of injury—nullification of their votes in the future—
needed for standing). Where, however, the Constitution affirmatively requires congressional 
consent to make lawful certain acts, making the act of voting necessary to legalize certain 
conduct, it is arguable that a requirement of having sought or being able to win a vote should 
have no place.  
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political remedies—holding hearings, for example, or threatening not to appropriate 
funds for programs the President cares about—that, even if not directly related to the 
allegedly unlawful conduct, might be effective in encouraging compliance.187 The 
standing issue here, thus, remains a close one.  
D. Appropriations, Legislative Vesting, and Take Care Clause 
By contrast to claims based on a complete deprivation of the right of Members of 
Congress to vote on narrow and specific issues, claims under the Appropriations, 
Legislative Vesting, and Take Care Clauses have greater potential for expanding 
interbranch litigation. An Appropriations Clause claim argues that some part of the 
government is expending or committing funds of the United States without an 
appropriations law, in violation of the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, 
which states that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law.” A Legislative Vesting Clause claim argues that 
executive action amounts to lawmaking in violation of Article I, Section 1, which 
vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in the Congress. Take Care Clause 
claims allege that the President is in violation of obligations under Article II, Section 
3, stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  
The Appropriations Clause is not limited to executive officials, so in theory action 
by judicial or legislative officers may create Appropriations Clause violations; to the 
extent that statutory law limits drawing of funds to Treasury officials,188 they may 
play an intermediary role for other government officials. Appropriations Clause 
objections may overlap with Legislative Vesting or Take Care Clause claims: to the 
extent that a statute is claimed either not to appropriate funds or affirmatively to 
prohibit expenditure of funds in a certain way, challengers might argue that the 
Executive Branch has failed to “take care” that a law enacted by Congress has been 
faithfully executed or that the Executive Branch action is in derogation of the 
exclusive vesting of the “legislative” power in Congress. But Legislative Vesting or 
Take Care Clause claims can have an even greater breadth, encompassing in theory 
virtually any interpretive disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch.  
Both sets of issues arise in a pending case in the D.C. Circuit, involving challenges 
to how the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was being administered. In U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell,189 the district court rejected claims of standing based on 
the Legislative Vesting Clause (on reasoning that would apply by implication to the 
                                                                                                             
 
 187. For example, Congress has legislated in some detail on the circumstances in which it 
has consented to receipt of gifts from foreign governments. See 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012) 
(establishing conditions under which Congress consents to an employee of the United States, 
including the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, accepting gifts from 
foreign donors, including a dollar amount under which retention of the gift is permitted, 
exempting defined “decorations” from the ban, and requiring reporting and turning over to the 
United States of gifts above a set amount in value, among others).  
 188. See Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/T5AQ-SKE8] (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) (noting that the Department is responsible 
for “paying all bills of the U.S.”).  
 189. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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Take Care Clause),190 but upheld congressional standing to allege a violation of the 
Appropriations Clause of Article I, Section 9. The House argued that in making 
payments the ACA required to be paid to insurers for “cost-sharing offsets,” the 
Administration violated the Appropriations Clause because there was no 
appropriation to support the payment.191 The Administration responded that a 
permanent appropriation in § 1324, which both sides agreed covered payment for 
“premium tax credits,” also covered the cost-sharing offsets, in light of the “structure 
and design” of “intertwined subsidies;”192 this position was also supported by the 
House Democratic leadership in its amicus brief supporting Burwell, in light of 
statutory language that the cost-sharing offsets “shall” be paid.193  
The district court distinguished constitutional claims that monies were spent 
without an appropriation from claims that the Administration was misinterpreting 
and misapplying the statute; it dismissed counts alleging that the expenditures were 
in violation of § 1324 as a “statutory” question on which the House lacked standing194 
But it upheld standing on the claimed violations of the Appropriations Clause,195 a 
theory that appears to turn on the meaning of this same statutory provision. Where 
an administration agrees that an appropriation is required, but argues that the statute 
provides for it, the constitutional question turns entirely on issues of statutory 
interpretation. This illustrates the expansive possibilities if standing on 
Appropriations Clause claims is upheld.  
While the district court found “injury in fact” because Congress is the only body 
authorized to enact laws authorizing expenditures,196 this is true for all lawmaking 
                                                                                                             
 
 190. When the Speaker of the House sought approval of a resolution to bring the action in 
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, he invoked the Take Care Clause. See ALISSA M. 
DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44450, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES V. BURWELL AND 
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING TO SUE 1 (2016) (“In his public comments prior to introduction of 
H.Res. 676, Speaker John Boehner stated that the purpose of the suit would be to compel the 
President to follow his oath of office and comply with his constitutional responsibility to ‘take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”). The complaint itself, however, couched the 
challenge in terms of the legislative power being vested only in Congress, to be exercised 
through the bicameralism and presentment requirements. In this context, at least, the 
Legislative Vesting and Take Care Clause claims seem like mirror image ways of making the 
same basic claim. Cf. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing 
Take Care Clause challenge to Executive Branch’s program of Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (DAPA)), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).  
 191. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 70–71. 
 192. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 175–81 (D.D.C. 
2016), appeal held in abeyance by 676 F. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (mem.). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(3)(A) (2012), discussed in Brief Amici Curiae of Members of 
Congress in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 5, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (No. 16-5202) (placing weight on the statute’s use of the word “shall” in 
describing government obligations to make the contested payments). 
 194. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 75–76. 
 195. See id. at 74. 
 196. Id. at 71. The district court also suggested that the Appropriations Clause was a 
“specific” kind of injury, one based on a “prohibition.” Id. at 79. But the Appropriations Clause 
is far less specific than many grants of authority to Congress, and its passive voice prohibition 
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authority. The district court reasoned that the “constitutional structure would 
collapse, and the role of the House would be meaningless, if the Executive could 
circumvent the appropriations process and spend funds however it pleases.”197 That 
may be correct, but no one argued that the President could spend without an 
appropriation.198 
Where there is a good faith interpretive dispute about the scope of an 
appropriation, the availability and adequacy of legislative countermeasures—
discussed in Raines v. Byrd—is clear, indeed, more so on appropriations than almost 
any other subject of legislation. Congress pays a great deal of attention to such issues 
in its legislative process; it frequently enacts affirmative prohibitions on spending 
(but did not do so in the ACA provisions at issue in this case). Disagreements over 
expenditures and their authority go back to the Founding; they exist across historical 
periods; and they have been consistently addressed politically, either through 
oversight or new legislation. (Indeed, as early as the 1790s there were 
acknowledgments in Congress that what the text of an appropriation law might be 
thought to require is different from the interpretive practice or custom199—a tricky 
thing for a court to penetrate accurately, especially during a time of heightened 
hyperpolarization.)  
                                                                                                             
 
is far more general. On the other hand, violations of this clause involving expenditures not 
authorized by law are unlikely to create concrete injuries for individuals (except to the extent 
that expenditures from a limited fund established for one purpose diminishes funds available 
for others). To the extent congressional standing were to be recognized for violations of this 
clause, it would be important to develop some internal limit, for example, where there is no 
arguable basis for the claim of statutory authority. See infra text accompanying notes 198, 206.  
 197. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at at 71. 
 198. In Allen v. Wright, the Court described the challengers’ claim that methods established 
by the IRS to prevent granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools were 
ineffective towards that goal and thus invalid. 468 U.S. 737, 740–45 (1984). In denying 
standing, the Court incorporated separation of powers concerns in its analysis. See id. at 760–
61. These concerns, the Court wrote, “counsel[] against recognizing standing in a case brought, 
not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a 
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties,” 
id. at 761, thereby suggesting that while the IRS retained some discretion over how to enforce 
the law, it did not dispute its legal duty to do so. See also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 844  
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, J., dissenting) (“What the plaintiffs actually challenge here is the 
adequacy of agency enforcement procedures . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737.  
 199. See WILMERDING, supra note 60, at 28–29 (describing how in the 1790s, Treasury 
interpretations of spending authorities were uniform notwithstanding changes in statutory 
wording); id. at 48 (quoting a Federalist member of Congress in 1801 explaining that a practice 
of using money for one subject within a department for another was the custom, which was 
“illegal; but its being the custom palliates it”); id. at 78 (noting that in 1816 the practice of 
ignoring limitations in appropriations laws had “reached so high a pitch” it attracted Calhoun's 
attention); id. at 92 (noting an objection around 1820 to criticizing a department for ignoring 
a limit because all departments did). Wilmerding concluded that an 1874 law changed practice, 
id. at 130, but did not eliminate problems created by the practice of underappropriation, in the 
expectation that departments would exceed budgets and make up the rest with deficiency bills, 
id. at 141.  
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In Raines v. Byrd the Court also noted that the suit was not being brought by the 
houses of Congress as an institutional matter, although the statute authorized 
individual actions.200 Here, the litigation was authorized by the House, but it was not 
authorized by a statute (enacted through the bicameral process); nor did both houses 
of Congress appear together, as in Chadha. While it may be less likely that an 
individual would have standing to challenge expenditures than it was likely (in 
Raines v. Byrd) that a private party would challenge non-expenditures, the Congress 
has ample political measures that can be invoked, including new substantive and 
appropriations legislation. Moreover, it could put courts in a very difficult position 
if one house of Congress had standing to challenge Executive Branch action and the 
other house had standing to defend Executive Branch action201—a possible result 
should one-house legislative standing be recognized outside of cases where the 
Constitution authorizes one house to act alone.202 These reasons together—the 
expansive nature of the theory, the variance from historical practice, the availability 
of legislative countermeasures, the absence of any prohibition on the disputed 
spending, the absence of statutory authorization for suit, and the presence of only one 
                                                                                                             
 
 200. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
 201. This is not a fanciful possibility. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the 
Senate had opposed the provision, sought and defended by the House, to strip three specific 
civil servants of their jobs. See id. at 312–13 (reporting also the President’s statement, in 
signing the bill, that “The Senate yielded, as I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our 
conduct of the war. But I cannot so yield without placing on record my view that this provision 
is not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.”). The House participated as 
amicus in the litigation, the Senate did not. In both Dickerson and Windsor, Democratic 
Members of Congress filed amicus briefs taking positions opposite those taken by the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House (a group entirely controlled by the majority 
party). See Grove & Devins, supra note 102, at 618–19; cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2004) (noting the difference in views of the mother, who was 
the custodial parent, and the father, with respect to their daughter hearing the Pledge of 
Allegiance in school as a factor supporting the conclusion that the father lacked prudential 
standing to assert the claim based on his relationship with the child). (If a house has standing 
to challenge, or to defend, executive action as inconsistent, or consistent, with a statute, and if 
the Executive Branch’s action is struck down in the trial court but the Executive Branch 
decides not to appeal, the house defending the Executive Branch action could nonetheless take 
an appeal, creating the potential for significant intrusion on the Executive Branch’s “take care” 
responsibilities to control litigation for the government.)  
 202. For discussion of whether participating as a party in litigation involving enforcement 
laws would enable parts of Congress to do what they otherwise could not do except through 
the bicameral and presentment process under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 955–56 
(1983) (holding that when Congress or a part thereof takes action that has “the purpose and 
effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative 
branch,” its action must ordinarily be achieved through the processes of bicameral enactment 
and presentment to the President required by Article I Section 7, unless the procedure is 
explicitly authorized, e.g., treaty approval by the Senate), see Grove & Devins, supra note 
102, at 627; see also Grove, supra note 21, at 1350–51, 1363–64 (providing normative reasons, 
sounding  in part in liberty interests, against legislative standing to challenge Executive Branch 
litigation positions).   
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house—should probably have led to a different result on the standing of the House 
to bring the action.203 
Take Care and Legislative Vesting Clause claims for congressional standing are 
especially worrisome. Any disagreement over how a statute is administered can be 
reframed as a violation of the President’s Take Care Clause responsibilities (and cor-
respondingly, an attenuated deprivation of Congress’s right to vote to enact legisla-
tion). As the district court wrote, “[t]he argument proves too much”;204 to allow 
standing on such claims would involve a large expansion of judicial authority to re-
solve partisan disagreements over statutory interpretation.205 As with Appropriations 
Clause claims, there may be a judicially manageable distinction capable of being 
drawn between a presidential administration asserting an interpretive position about 
the meaning of a statute, on the one hand, and claiming that no statutory authority is 
required, on the other; or between an interpretive position asserted in good faith and 
one beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretive possibilities.206  But recognition of 
                                                                                                             
 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 85–103.  
 204. “The argument proves too much. If it were accepted, every instance of an extra-
statutory action by an Executive officer might constitute a cognizable constitutional violation, 
redressable by Congress through a lawsuit. Such a conclusion would contradict decades of 
administrative law and [constitutional] precedent . . . .” U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 205. Indeed, the Court has recently noted the impact of partisan affiliation with legal 
judgments made by the Congress. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2015) (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in dissent, maintains that, 
under the Elections Clause, the state legislature can trump any initiative-introduced 
constitutional provision regulating federal elections. He extracts support for this position from 
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, 41st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 46–47 (1866). There, Michigan voters had amended the State Constitution to 
require votes to be cast within a resident’s township or ward. The Michigan Legislature, 
however, passed a law permitting soldiers to vote in other locations. One candidate would win 
if the State Constitution’s requirement controlled; his opponent would prevail under the 
Michigan Legislature’s prescription. The House Elections Committee, in a divided vote, ruled 
that, under the Elections Clause, the Michigan Legislature had the paramount power. As the 
minority report in Baldwin pointed out, however, the Supreme Court of Michigan had reached 
the opposite conclusion, holding, as courts generally do, that state legislation in direct conflict 
with the State’s constitution is void. Baldwin, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, at 50. The Baldwin 
majority's ruling, furthermore, appears in tension with the Election Committee’s unanimous 
decision in Shiel just five years earlier. . . . Finally, it was perhaps not entirely accidental that 
the candidate the Committee declared winner in Baldwin belonged to the same political party 
as all but one member of the House Committee majority responsible for the decision. In short, 
Baldwin is not a disposition that should attract this Court's reliance.”) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  
 206. Public decision makers, including courts, are called on in other settings to make 
judgments about whether arguments are made in good faith or go beyond the bounds of 
reasonableness. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (requiring that attorneys sign court filings to 
certify that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
890 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:845 
 
legislative standing to challenge actions under the Legislative Vesting, Take Care, or 
Appropriations Clauses should be viewed with the greatest of caution, because of the 
expansive potential they have to substantially expand interbranch litigation and judi-
cial intervention in fraught disputes between coequal branches of government.207  
IV. COURTS, DEMOCRACY, STANDING, AND POLITICAL PATHOLOGIES  
I conclude by revisiting my earlier concerns about whether expanding congres-
sional standing may pose risks both to courts and to democracy. 
First, entertaining such actions increases the occasions of direct confrontation 
with other branches and invites courts to make decisions on sensitive separation of 
powers issues on which they have little comparative advantage and limited ability to 
enforce their judgments. The risks of courts getting structural issues wrong is high, 
as is the likelihood over the long run of the courts engendering hostility from one or 
more political branches in ways that could interfere with the exercise of the courts’ 
central role in protecting individual rights.208 Even once highly effective courts may 
find themselves in fraught circumstances, as experience elsewhere suggests. 
Second, increased legislative standing poses potential risks for effective repre-
sentative government. Here I draw on the work of political scientist Aurelain Craiutu 
                                                                                                             
 
establishing new law . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–
54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the challenge to the Senate’s 
use of a committee to hear evidence in impeachment trial was nonjusticiable, but suggesting 
that the result might be different were the Senate to use a coin flip);  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985)  (holding that ordinarily agency discretion to enforce is not subject 
to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, but noting that it was not reaching a 
“situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly 
adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities”) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); 
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J.) (noting that courts should 
not condemn Presidential action in area of broad discretion “except in a case of clear abuse 
amounting to bad faith”) (emphasis added); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: 
The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 255 (1998) 
(suggesting that the impeachment trial of federal judge Samuel Chase established that 
Congress could not “elevate a legitimate difference of opinion into a high crime or 
misdemeanor”). 
 207. Interestingly, the Court has been especially reluctant to recognize private parties’ 
standing to compel government to enforce the law against third parties. See Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the 
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 
(2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) 
(finding nonjusticiable challenge, by mother of child born out-of-wedlock, to prosecutor’s 
discriminatory policy of not enforcing child support obligations of fathers of out-of-wedlock 
children). But it is surely more consistent with the way the constitutional system has operated 
to allow private parties to bring such actions than to expand existing boundaries of 
congressional standing. See also infra note 218 and accompanying text.  
 208. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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on moderation. In his recent book, he argues that moderation is “an essential ingre-
dient in the functioning of all open societies because it acts as a buffer against ex-
tremism and promotes a civil form of politics indispensable to the smooth running of 
democratic institutions.”209 Moderation can be exercised by persons of the left or of 
the right; it requires a certain epistemic humility, an awareness that those with whom 
one disagrees may have something of value to contribute.210  
Moderation is linked, he argues, to a willingness to compromise.211 And in a het-
erogeneous democracy, compromise is often needed to allow governance to happen. 
For Craiutu, no democratic “regime can properly function without compromise, bar-
gaining, and moderation”; indeed, he says, “the proper functioning of our representa-
tive system and institutions depends to a great extent on political moderation.”212 
Rather, “a democratic world is a chronically imperfect one . . . which can survive 
only if the main political actors do not act as if their positions and ideas were absolute 
and universally valid.”213 Craiutu is not alone in emphasizing the importance of mod-
eration as an essential aspiration of law. For Karol Soltan, moderation is an aspect of 
civic life essential to combat human destructiveness,214 and is a project of law that 
“cannot be sustained without support from outside the courts.”215 
                                                                                                             
 
 209. AURELIAN CRAIUTU, FACES OF MODERATION: THE ART OF BALANCE IN AN AGE OF 
EXTREMES 5 (2017).  
 210. Id. at 10, 239, 241. 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 25–33.  
 212. Id. at 17. It takes courage to be moderate, he argues, to pursue the “art of balance,” 
between often good but competing principles based on understanding that most public issues 
involve tradeoffs between “two partially true points of view.” Id.; see also Karol Edward 
Soltan, Constitutional Patriotism and Militant Moderation, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 96, 99–101 
(2008) (arguing for “militant moderation”). Soltan argues that moderation is a better political 
theory for constitutionalism than is liberalism; for him, moderation requires a commitment to 
“moral pluralism,” an attention to balancing important values, and a commitment to the need 
to justify action with good reasons. Id. at 100. 
 213. CRAIUTU, supra note 209, at 243. 
 214. See Karol Edward Soltan, The Project of Law, Moderation, and the Global 
Constitution, 25 MD. J. INT'L L. 230, 237 (2010) [hereinafter Soltan, The Project of Law] 
(“[L]aw cannot be seen as the application of one logically coherent theory. So law does not 
maximize wealth. And law is not fully captured . . . by, say, a Rawlsian theory of justice or a 
Dworkinian principle of equality. Balancing and proportionality are at the heart of the rule of 
law, including balancing between principles and rules.”) (footnotes omitted). For Soltan, “the 
project of law [is that of] serving moderation through courts.” Id. (emphasis omitted). His 
concept of moderation is based on impartial rationality, pluralism, and opposition to 
destructiveness. See also Karol Edward Soltan, The Missing Alternative, 47 TULSA L. REV. 
185, 187 (2011) (“Moderation as a generic form of politics can be seen as centered on three 
principles. First, it centers on opposition to forces of destruction, their power and effects. 
Second, it manifests an appreciation of complexity, of ‘unity in diversity,’ of polycentricity 
and pluralism, of various forms of attractive balance. And, finally, it supports forms of 
rationalism that take human fallibility seriously.”). 
 215. Soltan, The Project of Law, supra note 214, at 242. 
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In an age of hyperpolarization, opening up more avenues of litigation for 
Members of Congress is unlikely to improve prospects for moderation and compro-
mise in the political arena.216 Courts declare winners and losers, based on legal prin-
ciples; legislatures should be the forum of good political compromise. To expand the 
capacity of congressional actors to litigate political disputes with the Executive 
Branch is not only a departure from existing practice but risks being fundamentally 
corrosive of whatever hopes exist for regaining a sense of moderation, compromise, 
and respect for one’s opposition in Congress.  
Perhaps these hopes of returning to a congressional process with more place for 
moderation and compromise will be fruitless. If so, perhaps resort to courts will come 
to seem more necessary and the potential risks of greater resort to courts correspond-
ingly lower, vis-à-vis a polarized, frozen, and unworkable status quo. But if courts 
are to become more basic institutions of governance, it might be necessary to rethink 
who is appointed, how, and for how long.  
There are, to be sure, jurisdictions that separate less fiercely the domain of law 
and politics. Constitutional courts in France and Germany, which can hear cases 
brought by dissenting legislators, are typically staffed by a bench that includes mem-
bers with considerable political experience; appointments are typically for eight- to 
twelve-year nonrenewable terms, usually staggered.217 This structure provides regu-
lar political inputs to those courts. But the U.S. separation of powers system works 
on different assumptions—that indefinite, “life” tenure better protects judicial inde-
pendence from politics and thus better secures protection of individuals against ma-
joritarian forces. Expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to hear disputes between 
Congress and the Executive, without major changes in the appointment structure of 
the federal judiciary, would likely result in greater tensions between the democratic 
and the constitutionalist aspects of the U.S. system.  
CONCLUSION 
The purposes of democratic constitutionalism would thus be well served by re-
calling that not all interbranch disputes—even constitutional disputes—need to be 
resolved in the courts. Waiting to resolve an issue may sometimes be the better 
choice, in a society that values both democracy and constitutionalism. For it is most 
important that the courts be available and have legitimacy to protect against excesses 
of majoritarian processes that injure individuals.  
At the same time, understanding the important role of courts in providing a forum 
of principle for resolution of individual claims of injury and in enforcing the rule of 
law would favor, as I discuss elsewhere, a more generous conception of injury for 
                                                                                                             
 
 216. The prospect of litigation by the losing side might be thought to provide incentives 
for the stronger side to moderate its impositions on the weaker, as Daniel Francis has suggested 
to me. But the hyperpolarization of the present moment means that interbranch claims may 
often be invoked in distinctively partisan disputes, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006), where such litigation 
seems unlikely to have such a moderating effect and more likely to reinforce “winner-take-
all” attitudes prioritizing immediate partisan success over policy advancement. 
 217. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 538–40 (reproducing a chart showing the 
structures, terms, and appointing authorities of constitutional courts). 
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purposes of claims by individuals of violation of constitutional and statutory rights 
than the Court has been willing to entertain in a number of areas.218 Bright line pre-
clusive rules categorically denying standing for broad ranges of plaintiffs or claims 
are neither necessary nor desirable, given the ease with which standing assertions 
can be evaluated as a threshold matter and the role, as Professor Fallon has put it, 
“not just [of] the provision of the Constitution under which a plaintiff brings suit, but 
also . . . the nature of the governmental action or policy that a plaintiff seeks to chal-
lenge.”219 There may well be a need for flexibility in response to extraordinary in-
stances of bad faith or overt lawlessness in evaluating institutional claims of injury 
from one part of the government against another,220 where other mechanisms (of pri-
vate suit, or political remedies) are likely to be unavailing. Ordinarily, though, it is 
the better part of wisdom for courts to presume the good faith of other branches and 
to continue to structure standing law on the assumption that most controversies be-
tween the branches are best addressed through political mechanisms.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 218. See Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error 
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. L.J. 127 (2014) (criticizing decisions denying standing in City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and Clapper v. Amnesty International, 568 U.S. 398 
(2013)); Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State 
Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1890–99 (2016) (criticizing the 
decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).  
 219. Fallon, supra note 103, at 1077.  
 220. For thoughtful discussion of both the tendency to make claims of bad faith in 
American culture and the corresponding reluctance of the courts to ascribe bad faith to the 
institutions of governance, see David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (2016).  
